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TWO "WRONGS" DO/CAN MAKE A RIGHT:
REMEMBERING MATHEMATICS, PHYSICS, &
VARIOUS LEGAL ANALOGIES (TWO NEGATIVES
MAKE A POSITIVE; ARE REMEDIES WRONG?)
THE LAW HAS MADE HIM EQUAL, BUT MAN HAS
NOT
John C. Duncan, Jr.*
"It is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, but not for all persons,
only those who are equal."
Aristotle'
Equal- "alike; uniform; on the same plane or level with respect to
efficiency, worth, value, amount or rights."
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article demonstrates the incomplete logic and inconsistent legal
reasoning used in the argument against affirmative action. The phrase "two
wrongs don't make a right" is often heard in addressing various attempts to
equalize, to balance, and to correct the acknowledged wrongs of slavery and
segregation and their derivative effects. Yet, "two wrongs do/can make a right"
has a positive connotation, or at least is not considered a wrong to correct
alleged wrongful actions in other areas. One example of such a remedy is
veterans' preference to balance or make up for soldiers having put their lives in
9 Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law, PhD Stanford University,
JD Yale Law School, MBPA Southeastern University, MA, MS with Honors
University of Michigan, BA with Distinction DePauw University. I wish to
acknowledge various research assistants; Kristin Hilty, LouAnn Kitchen who
provided exceptional editorial skills, Alyssa Campbell, and Ashley Harris.
Inspiration came from my mother, Yvonne AJ Duncan with degrees from Boston
University and West Virginia State University and especially my wife, Elizabeth DL
Duncan, Esq. with degrees from Howard University Law School and Fisk University.
ARIsToTLE, PoLrcs (H. Rackham trans., 1977).
2 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 536 (6th ed. 1990).
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harms way. Another example is the remedy of reparations for the wrongful
internment of Japanese Americans during World War H. Some other examples
of actions which have these rightful or affirmative remedies are environmental
wrongs 3, anti-trust violations4, employment discriminations 5, labor-management
unfair practices6, and disability concerns7 to name a few. Whereas in the area
of remedying wrongs in civil rights involving minorities, especially Blacks, the
second wrong necessary to establish Blacks 8 on equal ground is considered
"reverse discrimination." The remedy conveys to some the disparaging
connotation of a "wrong."
The premise that "two wrongs don't make a right" finds its origins as an
English proverb in the late eighteenth century.9 This proverbial saying is
especially applied in the context of punishment or retaliation. More "words of
the wise" than deep philosophical contemplation, the slogan has been used to
show that "wronging" the person that wronged you is not a socially acceptable
solution.
This article reviews the history of societal and judicial wrongs against
Blacks, as well as the evolution of the narrowing in legal reasoning concerning
discrimination against minorities, including Blacks. Next, the legal reasoning
behind legacy programs, considered true reverse discrimination by this author,
3 See infra pages 68-70
4 See infra page 73
5 See infra pages 77-81
6id.
7 See infra pages 81-83
8 The following terms may be used interchangeably in this paper, Afro-American, African
American, Black, Colored, Negro. The use of the terms "Black" and "White" in relation to race
will be capitalized in this article.
9 ELIZABETH KNOWLES, THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (5th ed. 1999). One of
the first known citations of the saying was in J. Kerr's Several Trials of David Barclay, 1814.
As used in Kerr's novel, the slogan "two wrongs don't make a right" refers to the widespread
belief that an evil act cannot be cancelled out by a second evil act. For example, school children
are taught that they should not hit their schoolmate, even though the school mate may have hit
him first. When many people have been wronged, it is natural instinct to want to wrong the
person back to make things right, but "two wrongs don't make a right" according to Kerr's
reasoning. Besides using retaliation to right a wrong, people also attempt to justify committing
a wrong on the grounds that someone else committed an act of wrong first. Here, the second
wrong is of the same type committed by the first guilty party. For example, if person A breaks
into person B's garage and steals B's bike, B feels justified in breaking into A's garage to steal
the bike back. It is upon these situations of retaliation and acts of vengeance that the saying is
most logically applied. However, two wrongs don't make a right should not and need not be
extended to all remedies that right a wrong.
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will be reviewed to show the inconsistency with the rationale against
affirmative action in the area of discrimination against Blacks. The statistical
improbability of correcting the first "wrong," without imposing the second
"wrong" of affirmative action, is then explored. This statistical approach is
followed by mathematical models, including a regression analysis l° showing
that if the incomplete logic and inconsistent legal reasoning continues, equality
for Blacks will never be achieved.
The article then takes a brief look at the philosophy behind slavery and
suppression, the first "wrong," and the possible remedy of affirmative action,
the alleged "second wrong." Finally, it concludes with a review of legal
analysis in areas where "two wrongs do make a right" for most Americans,
including restitution to Japanese-Americans for internment during World War
II, environmental wrongs, veterans preference, antitrust violations, employment
disputes, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
It has been half a century since the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansasil supported the colorblind principles through
desegregation of the public schools. After decades of programs designed to
offer opportunities to those previously denied opportunity, state and national
politicians 12 are still debating re-examination of affirmative action programs.
The debate includes two opposing points of view.
10 "Regression analysis provides a systematic technique for estimating, with confidence
limits, the unspecified constants from a new set of data, or for testing whether the new data are
consistent with the hypothesis." EDWIN CROW ET AL., STATISTICS MANUAL 147 (1960).
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12 In 1995, Pete Wilson, the Governor of California, based his brief campaign for President
on an anti-affirmative action platform. Wilson supported Proposition 187, a ballot initiative
passed by California voters that bars illegal immigrants from receiving free health care and
education. He later endorsed the California Civil Rights Initiative, a proposed State
constitutional amendment that would terminate preferences for women and minorities in jobs,
education, and state-awarded contracts. President Clinton, in what appears to be an appeal to
moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats, ordered an audit of federal affirmative
action policies in February, 1995. In April, 1995, at the California Democratic Convention, the
President said affirmative action should be reconsidered. Although he acknowledged progress
for women and minorities as a good thing, he said, "We must respond to those who feel
discriminated against....This is a psychologically difficult time for the so-called 'angry White
man.'...We must ask ourselves, 'Are these programs working? Are they fair?"' Deanna Hodgin,
Health Care Examines Affirmative Action, Nurseweek, Vol. 8, No. 11, May 1995 at 1-3.
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The first viewpoint is that historical inequalities continue to have a negative
effect on society.13 Progress to correct the inequities has been too slow;
therefore, the government should create a more even playing field, allowing
women and minorities to compete on an equal basis. Realizing that nothing of
value is achieved without sacrifice; proponents of this argument believe that the
price is well worth paying to achieve the net gain in fairness and diversity
achieved. This is a utilitarian argument in addition to being the right thing to
do according to those of this view. "The Left has told us to support it as
compensation for past injustices, a guarantee of a fair share of the economic
pie, and because it is a civil right, guaranteed by the Constitution and refined by
later statutes.,
1 4
Alternatively, the advocates of the second, or opposing, viewpoint argue
that preferences perpetuate discrimination. They further argue that set-asides
and other special programs promote less qualified candidates at the expense of
traditionally qualified candidates.1 5 This expense to the traditionally qualified
13 These viewpoints are from the author's perspective, and evolved through research and
discussions with colleagues.
14 JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1 (1996).
15 Today, seventy percent of us are members of at least one protected class. LEwiN G. JOEL
III, Discrimination and Related Issues, in EVERY EMPLOYEE'S GUIDE TO THE LAW 132 (1993)
("Unless you are an average-looking, [W]hite, agnostic, male of no discernible national origin
who is under forty and has no handicap or even something that could be perceived as a
handicap, you are protected!") Yet the terms "protected class" and "affirmative action" are met
with increasing hostility. Opponents of affirmative action promote the belief that gains for
minority groups have resulted in reduced opportunities for other groups. White people,
compelled to compete against each other, are urged to believe that advances Blacks make will
be at Whites' expense.
Here, government and politics reflect a harsh economy. Indeed, this country is
less a society, certainly less a community, than any of the countries with which it
compares itself. A reason commonly given is that the United States is a large and
diverse country. What is less commonly acknowledged is that its culture makes a
point of exaggerating differences and exacerbating frictions. This appears most
vividly in the stress placed on race."
ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1995).
This opposition is produced, in part, by declining lifestyles and fear resulting from falling
real wages. However, the data show that African Americans, Hispanics, and other minority
groups not only did not gain during this period of falling real wages but, in fact, their wages
declined even more. Kweisi Mfume, Business Playing Field Still Needs Levelingfor Minorities,
WALL ST. J., June 6, 1995. Thus, this hostility seems illogical and unsupported by economic
data analysis.
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candidates (non-minorities) is labeled "reverse discrimination." "The Right has
told us to resist affirmative action because it is unmeritocratic, leads to reverse
discrimination, and is an un-American guarantee of equal results instead of
equal opportunity., 16 In addition, some feel this causes qualified minority
candidates to have their credentials questioned. They conclude that people
should be treated as individuals. To accomplish this, affirmative action laws
should be repealed and laws banning discrimination should be enforced. 17 This
is a more deontological argument, which will be further explored infra. This
article attempts to refute the reasoning used in arriving at such a conclusion.
Throughout the history of the United States legal system, when one has
been wronged steps have been taken to make him (perhaps as opposed to her)
whole. This is an area where Black and female issues coincide. These steps
occur through specific performance, restitution, punitive damages, and
affirmative action, all of which potentially adversely affect (or wrong) the
losing party. These remedies, or second "wrongs," in this article's equation
have been historically accepted in areas such as contracts and torts. In fact,
remedies, or second "wrongs," have even expanded to what some consider
extremes to include treble damages in areas where the courts perceive an initial
wrong against society (These areas include environmental law and antitrust
inter alia.). However, the courts, failing to perceive discrimination as a
In the 21st Century, it is clear that an increasing percentage of the workforce will be
oppressed minorities. "It is projected that by the year 2000, the majority of entrants in the U.S.
workforce will be from minority groups, with minorities accounting for 43 percent of the
workforce." Id. National statistics show that while minorities make up nearly 25 percent of the
American population, they own only six percent of operating businesses. These minority-owned
businesses account for just one percent of the nation's gross business receipts, and generate less
than three percent of the employment produced in the country annually. Id. Additionally, a
study by the California Institute of Technology projected thati by the year 2000, California will
be less than 50 percent White, with the other 50 percent divided roughly equally between
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLIcS OF RACE
AND SEX ON CAMPUS 32 (1992) quoting Joseph Supplivan, College Leaders Focus on Enmity
between Races, N.Y.TnimEs, April 23, 1988, at 34.
In 1994, operating expenditures for the Small Business Association's 8(a) Program of just
$20.5 million helped minority-owned firms obtain more than $4.3 billion in federal contracts
which, in turn, generated an estimated $60 million in tax revenues. Thus, tax revenues exceeded
minority business development costs by almost $40 million. However, in spite of this level of
performance, minority businesses received only about 3.5 percent of federal contract dollars. In
contrast, McDonnell Douglas Corp. alone received $8.2 billion in government contracts -- 93
percent of the total received by every minority firm in the country combined. Mfume, at 2.
Therefore, viewing minority business programs as tools for economic development is essential.
These programs are not social programs, they are investments in America's economic system.16 Id. D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 32 (1992).
17 id.
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continuing wrong against society, are rapidly evolving to disallow the remedy
or "second wrong" if it adversely affects another group (non-minority students).
By doing this, the courts implicitly deny minorities' their right to have a
remedy. Concomitantly, legal arguments claiming reverse discrimination have
progressed to disallow the second half of the equation if the second wrong has
the potential of adversely affecting a non-minority group.
Here, we chose to use simple mathematical theory to illustrate why the
logic against affirmative action is incomplete logic. To understand our logic,
however, one must stipulate to three basic assumptions. One, a positive integer
must be added to a negative integer to equal zero: for example, -4 + 4 = 0.
Two, before treating people as equal individuals, they must first be on equal
ground to be competitive. Three, there are a fixed number of opportunities in
society. To provide opportunity for the previously oppressed individuals to
achieve equal ground requires compromise on the opposite side of the
mathematical equation. The crucial part of the equation in jeopardy is the
remedial action (set asides, quotas, etc.) that compromises the previously
uninjured group. This is perceived as a "negative," the second negative in our
equation. This compromise is labeled by some affirmative action opponents as
"reverse discrimination." Without compromise to some, minorities will remain
on unequal ground.
While two wrongs do make a right at first glance may seem very negative,
at second glance, it is essentially a semantic game. Why is balancing or
rectifying an original wrong considered a wrong? Using mathematics and
physics as a comparison, this article attempts to manifest that the second wrong
is not really a wrong, but is often labeled as such. Perhaps, as in multiplication
in math, two negatives multiplied become a positive. In physics, to offset,
correct, and return to equilibrium from an original imbalance, there is an
opposite reaction, or imbalance, to eventually equalize the original imbalance.
Likewise in the law, there are numerous analogies such as capital punishment
in criminal law, which some perceive as a wrong versus as a remedy, and in
torts real damages.
Yet society is not so ready, or compelled, to label these counteractions,
deterrents, repair, or actions which put one back in his/her original position as
negatives, or wrongs, even though there is some discussion regarding capital
punishment. Why then are affirmative action, reparations, and other actions to
repair (put back in a tenable position to deter) so "wrong" in the case of Afro-
Americans? Is it semantics, or something else?
There is a distinction to be made between those who had no choice in terms
of their lot or station in America, such as Native Americans and Afro-
[Vol. 43
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Americans who are descendents of slaves, as opposed to those who actually
immigrated to the U.S. These two groups are non-immigrants. 18 Another
18 There are two groups that fall outside of the typical minority experience: North American
Indigenous Peoples (Native Americans), and Black Slaves brought to American against their
will (African Americans). These two groups find themselves outside of the typical minority
experience because of their special relationship with the United States. North American
Indigenous Peoples inhabited this land long before the first European explorers set foot upon
the Americas. As Westward expansion began, North American Indigenous Peoples found
themselves displaced, pushed aside to make room for the new wave of European settlers.
Despite their displacement, because they were indigenous, Native Americans are not
immigrants.
Long before the United States of America was established, as White Europeans began to
colonize the Americas, they brought with them Black Slaves to build this "New World." There
was never a true immigration by the Black Slaves, they were forcibly brought to the Americas.
The very notion of immigration implies that it is a migration of one's own choosing. There was
no choice for the Black Slaves but to follow their masters, thus placing them outside of the
typical notion of an immigrant, and even if attempts were made to escape, or achieve freedom
through the courts, they were denied. Over the last 400 years, these three groups have lived
together, "sharing" one land. Having inhabited America since its inception, African Americans
and Native Americans retain a special status within the minority as non-immigrants.
African-Americans:
There has arisen a significant difference between Blacks born within the United States, and
those who immigrate to the United States. Blacks from outside the United States do not
necessarily identify themselves as African Americans.
Typically, the term African American is reserved for Black individuals born in
the United States. Other individuals from Africa, the Caribbean, Central or South
America, and Canada usually refer to themselves by their country of origin or as
Black.... Others distinguish Afro-Americans (the descendants of Black slaves) from
African Americans (those who emigrated to the U.S. from elsewhere). Individuals
who come to the United States from other countries note that their experiences are
different from those of Blacks in the United States with respect to the legacy of
slavery, discrimination, and minority status. Although many of these Black
individuals had ancestors who were slaves, their cultures are tied to other indigenous
peoples and European countries in ways that are different from those of Blacks born
in the United States.
JANICE SANcHFz-HucLEs, THE FIRST SESSION wrrH AFRICAN AMERICANS: A STEP-BY-STEP
GUIDE TO THE MOST CRUCIAL (AND PERHAPS ONLY) OPPORTUNITY FOR EFFECTIVE CHANGE 2-3
(2000).
Why is there a significant difference between the Black immigrant experience, and the
African American experience? Black immigrants do not experience the same psychological,
sociological, and philosophical hindrances that African Americans do. However, this is not to
say that Black immigrants do not have their set of negative experiences from their encounters.
In addition, they are often treated the same as Afro-Americans once they arrive here. Some seek
to assimilate as Afro-Americans wish to be distinguished. Afro-Americans have lived for
centuries with the stigma of slavery and its after-effects: poverty, lack of education,
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group of victims could be various indigenous peoples, such as the Chamorro of
Guam, or the victims of class or caste, which would really open a Pandora's
Box such as the untouchables of India to raise comparisons with other societies.
Do we have the same Pandora's Box here, and is that why these remedies are
labeled a wrong? This author is suggesting that these remedies are labeled a
wrong because of how actions are semantically categorized or defined. Again,
discrimination, segregation, lack of respect, etc. "As a result of this history, many Afro-
Americans do not believe that it is possible to "pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.""
Id. The opposite is true for Black immigrants, or African Americans. Immigrants often come to
America to explore the freedoms and opportunities that Afro-Americans (the descendants of
slaves) have had to struggle to obtain. They come to America to study, to find employment, to
make a life that is their own under the freedoms that the United States Constitution protects.
Need citation from author.
Native Americans:
This same basic principle can be applied to Native Americans. Native Americans are not
immigrants, but were rather displaced when Europeans colonized the Americas. From a
practical viewpoint, Native Americans have no country, no homeland. They have nowhere to
emigrate from. This makes them distinctly unique. It is not that Native Americans cannot "pull
themselves up by their boot straps," but rather that they have no bootstraps to hold onto.
No economic development is allowed at all unless the indigenous people own
the land, which in most cases they don't because of unresolved legal battles or the
land being held as a trust for them by some government entity. When land is held in
trust (a "protectorate" arrangement), banks will not loan money on it, and the only
thing to do is lease it out for development to the very same government entity that
"protects" it for you.
(Quote attributed to Tom O'Connor, Department of Justice Studies & Applied
Criminology, North Carolina Wesleyan College Need appropriate citation from author).
There is a staggering difference when looking at the status of Afro-Americans and Native
Americans when compared to Whites; both peoples have inhabited the same land, for the same
amount of time (much longer in the case of Native Americans), but with unequal rights and
opportunities. The total population of the United States is 281,421,000. (2000 U.S. Census).
Whites total 211,460,00, or roughly 75.1%; African-Americans total 34,658,000, or 12.3%; and
American Indian and Alaskan Natives total 2,475,000, or 0.9%. About 5% of Whites are
consistently poor, while roughly 30% of Blacks are consistently poor. (Loretta Bass, Professor
of Sociology, U. of Okla., April lecture series, 2003. 49.6% of Whites have a household net
worth of $50,000.00 or more. 21% of Blacks have a household net worth of $50,000.00 or
more. Native Americans were not listed. U.S. CENSUS (2000).
In 2000, thirty-one million people were poor, roughly 11.3% of the population. Of that
Thirty-one million poor, 7.9 million of them were Afro-American. A minority group that
accounts for only 12.3% of the nation's population, accounted for 25.4% of the nation's poor.
There are other groups that could have been mentioned such as the descendants of the
"Shanghaied" Chinese who worked on the railroads, who have suffered similarly but were
allowed their original culture and were not separated if they spoke the same language. These
groups could be the subjects of other articles. The "Chinese Question" and American Labor
Historians, Stanford M. Lyman. NEW PoLrTcs, vol. 7, no. 4, Winter 2000 at footnote 11.
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an analogy, homicide in war is justified, but in peace times, there are various
gradations of unjustifiable "murder." Again, this author is suggesting a look at
society's attitude and philosophy concerning the Afro-American attempt,
including self-improvement, to be put back in a tenable position and to rectify
an original wrong or imbalance. The original wrongs are, of course, slavery
and the legalized segregation which followed.
This article reiterates what some may consider repetitive history. Although
it is vogue to say "forget the past," it is unwise to forget what has forever
changed the present and the future. Learning from other cultures and races,
such as the Jewish people, we believe the totality of the record must include
history to keep the memory alive to prevent harm in the future. Further, it must
be asked, "Why is there a Holocaust museum, but not a slavery museum?" 19
Americans understand the desire to have a museum to chronicle important
historical occurrences; however, it seems that it is difficult for our culture to
acknowledge that Americans intentionally committed such wrongs in the past.
Americans ostensibly prefer to deny, and try to forget our own shortcomings. It
is easier to deny and try to forget, yet, at the same time acknowledging the
wrongs done in "other countries" such as with the Holocaust and apartheid in
South Africa.
Having discussed the attempt being made in this paper to support, in
essence correcting or remedying a wrong, there are those who strongly oppose a
remedy such as reparations. One of the best overall attacks on a remedy such
as reparations is by David Horowitz in his book, Uncivil Wars: The
Controversy Over Reparations for Slavery2° . Using this book as a generic
response in opposition to a remedy for past harms, it can be seen why many
Blacks take the position of adopting an even stronger disposition in favor of
some type of remedy. On the other hand, there are some Blacks who are in
favor of a remedy, but recognize the futility of fighting what are seemingly the
majority population's views on the subject. This is only mentioned here to give
effect to the polemic of two wrongs making, or not making, a right.2'
19 This author strongly supports the idea and institution of a Holocaust museum with no
problem. The point being made here is the holocaust of slavery. We highlight Nazi Germany's
wrong of the past, but do not highlight America's wrong of the past.
20 DAVID HORowrrz, UNCIVIL WARs: THE CoNTRovERsY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY
(2002).
21 David Boyle reviewed Uncivil Wars: The Controversy Over Reparationsfor Slavery by
David Horowitz. David Horowitz presents several arguments opposing reparations. His
arguments are as follows:
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Before an end result of equality can be maintained, it must first be
achieved.22 Justice Blackman acknowledged that to achieve equality, we must
first consider race. "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race. There is no other way; and in order to treat some persons equally, we
must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the Equal Protection
Clause perpetuate racial supremacy., 23 Therefore, remedial action to correct
the imbalance must still occur, even if "unfair" to some groups who have
benefited from the disparity of opportunity in the past. An analogy could be
that legislation is not always "fair" to each and every person. This article seeks
to analyze and refute the incomplete logic and the inconsistent legal reasoning
of "two wrongs don't make a right" as it relates to racial discrimination and
those curative actions.
1. There is no single group responsible for the crime of slavery, 2. There is no
single group that benefited exclusively from slavery, 3. Only a tiny minority of White
Americans owned slaves, while others gave their lives to free them, 4. Most living
Americans have no connection (direct or indirect) to slavery, 5. The historical
precedents used to justify the reparations claim do not apply, and the claim itself is
based on race not injury, 6. The reparations argument is based on the unsubstantiated
claim that all African-Americans suffer from the economic consequences of slavery
and discrimination, 7. The reparations claim is one more attempt to turn African-
Americans into victims, and it sends a damaging message to the African-American
community and to others, 8. Reparations to African-Americans have already been
paid, 9. What about the debt Blacks owe to America,? and 10. The reparations claim
is a separatist idea that sets African-Americans against the nation that gave them
freedom.
David Boyle, Unsavory White Omissions? A Review of Uncivil Wars, 105 W. VA. L. REV.
655 (2003). This article does not disclaim nor disprove any of the arguments set forth by David
Horowitz, however, it does wish the reader to be aware of some of the arguments against
reparations for Blacks.
22 President Lyndon Johnson realized that remedial action must be achieved before a color-
blind principle could be maintained. In a commencement speech at Howard University on June
4, 1965, Johnson said:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate
him, bring him up to the starting line of a race, and then say, "You are free to compete
with all the others," and still justly believe that you have been completely fair. Thus,
it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the
ability to walk through those gates. This is the next and the more profound stage of
the battle for civil rights. We seek not just freedom, but opportunity. We seek not
just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory, but
equality as a fact and equality as a result.
Paul Roberts and Lawrence Stratton, Color Code, National Review, March 20, 1995, at 47.
23 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackman, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: "THE LAW HAS MADE HIM EQUAL, BUT MAN
HAS NOT"
24
The struggle for equality in America is over two centuries old. The
national anthem proclaims America is "the land of the free;" the Pledge of
Allegiance advocates "liberty and justice for all;" and the Declaration of
Independence declares all human creatures are "created equal. 25 Slaves sought
freedom; southern Blacks sought the right to vote; women sought full
participation in society; and poor people invoked "equality" as a cry to do
better.26 Three eras have tested the constitutional meaning of equality for
minority groups: The era of slavery,27 the era of segregation, 28 and the era of
civil rights.29
24This quote is from Darrow's final summation in the 1925 Sweet trial. In 1925, Darrow
defended eleven blacks accused of murder when gunfire from their house killed a member of a
white mob that had gathered outside to protest the presence of Dr. Ossian Sweet and his family
in an all white Detroit neighborhood.
25 HACKER, supra note 15, at 52.
26 ROBERT L. LINEBERRY AND GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: PEOPLE,
POLITcs, AND POLICY, 180 (1989).
27 From the 1600's to 1865, slavery took hold in the South. It characterized almost all
Black-White relationships and was constitutionally justified. In 1619 Blacks were brought to
Jamestown and sold to planters. In 1776 the rebels enlisted Blacks in the army to fight the
British only after the British offered freedom to Blacks who would fight on their side against the
rebels. In 1787 the Constitution provided for slaves to be counted as three-fifths of a person in
representation and permitted Congress to forbid the importation of new slaves after 1808. In
1857 the Dred Scott v. Sanford decision held that slaves could not gain freedom by escaping to
a free state or territory; it therefore upheld the constitutionality of slavery. 60 U.S. 393 (1856)
Finally, in 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude.
LINEBERRY, supra note 26, at 182.
28 From 1865 through 1954, segregation was legally required in the South and sanctioned
in the North. Lynching of many Blacks occurred in the South. In 1870 the Fifteenth
Amendment forbade racial discrimination in voting, although many states found ways to prevent
or discourage Blacks from voting. In 1877 came the end of reconstruction. Black gains in the
South (i.e. antidiscrimination laws) were reversed when confederates returned to power. Jim
Crow laws flourished, making segregation legal. By 1883 the Supreme Court ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit discrimination by private businesses and individuals.
Need citation from author In 1896 the Plessy v. Ferguson decision permitted "separate but
equal" at public facilities, thus constitutionally justifying segregation. 63 U.S. 537 (1896). In
1910, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded
by Blacks and Whites. In 1915 Guinn v. United States banned the grandfather clause that had
been used to prevent Blacks from voting. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). In 1941 an Executive Order
forbade racial discrimination in defense industries. In 1944 the Smith v. Allwright decision
banned all-White primaries. 322 U.S. 769 (1944). In 1948 President Truman ordered the
522 BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
Most Native Americans and Blacks were not immigrants. Instead, the
former group was conquered, while the latter was enslaved. Therefore, a
different psychological impact resulted from these different histories. The
unique impact on Blacks is manifested by the Constitutional reference to
counting slaves as three-fifths of a person in representation,3 ° the abolishment
of slavery and involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment, 3' and the
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting in the Fifteenth Amendment.
32
armed forces desegregated. In 1950 Sweatt v. Painter found the "separate but equal" policies
generally unacceptable in professional schools. 339 U.S. 629 (1950); see also Sipuel v. Bd. of
Regents of U. of Okla., 322 U.S. 631 (1948). LINEBERRY, supra note 26, at 183.
29 From 1954 through 1968 the civil rights movement grew as integration became a widely
accepted goal. This was followed by urban racial disorders in the 1960's and Black voting
increases. Attention shifted to equal results and affirmative action. In 1954 legal segregation
ended when the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka set aside its
precedent in Plessy v. Ferguson. In Brown the Court held that segregated schools were
inherently unequal and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. In 1955
Martin Luther King, Jr., lead a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama (there were also boycotts
in other cities such as Jacksonville, FL). In 1957 Federal troops enforced desegregation of a
Little Rock, Arkansas high school. In 1963 250,000 civil rights demonstrators marched on
Washington, D.C. In 1964 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act forbade discrimination in public
accommodations and provided that federal grants and contracts could be withheld from violators
of Title VI. Title VH of the Civil Rights Act forbade discrimination by employers and
empowered the Justice Department to sue violators. In 1965 the Voting Rights Act sent federal
registrars to Southern states and counties to protect Blacks' right to vote and give registrars the
power to impound ballots in order to enforce the act. An Executive Order required companies
with federal contracts to take affirmative action to ensure equal opportunity. Riots occurred in
Watts, California, and other cities. These type of riots occurred every summer in various cities
for the next five years. In 1967 Cleveland, Ohio became the first major city to elect a Black
mayor (Carl Stokes). In 1968 the Jones v. Mayer decision found all discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing illegal. In 1971 the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Ed. decision
approved busing as a means of combating state-enforced segregation. 402 U.S. 1(1971). In
1978 California Board of Regents v. Bakke forbade rigid racial quotas for medical school
admissions but did not forbid considering race as a factor when deciding admissions. 438 U.S.
265 (1978). In 1979 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum again permitted an affirmative action program
to favor Blacks if the program was designed to remedy past discrimination. 443 U.S. 193
(1979). Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman upheld school busing to remedy northern
school segregation. 443 U.S. 526 (1979). In 1972, Shirley Chisolm, member of Congress, and
in 1980, the Reverend Jesse Jackson became the first serious Black candidate for president. In
1984 Grove City College v. Bell forbade the federal government from taking away all federal
funds from a college that refused to file forms saying it did not discriminate. 465 U.S. 555
(1984) (Only a specific program risked its federal funds.). In 1988 Congress rewrote the Civil
Rights Act to "overturn" the implications of Grove City College. LINEBERRY, supra note 26, at
184-85.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.3.
31U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I.32 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I.
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The unique impact on Native Americans is manifested in a long history of
treaties, both broken and unbroken. Although the logic of this article is
applicable to both categories, the issues as they apply to Native Americans are
unique and deserve to be addressed separately. Therefore, this article merely
provides concrete logic to contradict the incomplete logic of "two wrongs don't
make a right" with decisions that have immediately affected Blacks and with
derivative effects on other groups such as females and Hispanics.33
The concept of equality was not mentioned in the Constitution of 1787.
Equality was impliedly, but not explicitly, granted in the Bill of Rights.34 The
only appearance of the idea of equality in the Constitution is in the Fourteenth
Amendment, one of three amendments passed after the Civil War.3 ' The
Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from denying citizens "equal protection
of the laws. 
3 6
The earliest piece of legislation concerning civil rights was the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.37 This statute forbids racial discrimination in making and
enforcing contracts.38 The civil rights movement and anti-discrimination
legislation of the 1960's caused employers to examine the treatment of women,
minorities, and other protected groups more closely. Affirmative action plans
were implemented to remedy past acts of discrimination. Affirmative action
programs have been established through court order, court-approved consent
decrees, and federal and state laws that impose affirmative action obligations on
government contractors.39
Quotas were originally prohibited under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but
were eventually recognized as necessary to correct the imbalance.4 ° Quotas
were implemented by President Lyndon Johnson, who issued Executive Order
33 However, the author fully acknowledges the impact this logic has on areas other than
civil rights.
34 "The Bill of Rights did not specify that only [W]hite people were guaranteed the right to
protection from self-incrimination, or that only men had the right to freedom of speech", albeit
impliedly so as segregation and denial of the fight to vote to Blacks and females supported the
implication. LINEBERRY, supra note 26, at 179. "When rights are granted without such
specification, the concept of equality has taken root." Id.
35 The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and the Fifteenth Amendment extended
the right to vote to Blacks. Id.
36U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
37 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
38 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(a) (1982).
39 CONNIE BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 351 (1991).
'0 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2004).
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11,246, requiring all federal government contractors and sub-contractors to
"take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, creed,
color, or national origin. ''41 Executive Order 11,246 required federal
government contractors to include in every government contract not exempted
by the order, a provision that states that the contractor will not discriminate in
employment.42 Individuals have no private cause of action alleging a violation
of this order43; however, the Department of Labor has sanctions available
through the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.an The sanctions
for violation of this law include suspending or terminating a government
contract and disqualifying the contractor from entering any future government
contracts.45
Government contractors are subject to affirmative action under additional
federal laws. For example, section 503 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973 requires employers with government contracts or subcontracts of more
that $10,000.00 to employ qualified handicapped persons and to take
affirmative action with respect to such individuals. Additionally, the Vietnam
Era Veterans Re-adjustment Assistance Act of 1972 requires employers with
federal contracts or subcontracts of $25,000.00 or more to take affirmative
action to employ and to advance in employment of disabled Vietnam-era
veterans. 46
Employers in the past have been allowed to voluntarily establish
affirmative action plans. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,47 the
Supreme Court upheld a collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the company that contained an affirmative action plan giving preference to
Black employees entering into skilled-craft training positions. In that case, a
White worker alleged that the affirmative action plan resulted in junior Black
employees' receiving preference to senior White employees, thus discriminating
against him and other White employees in violation of Title VII.4 The Court
reasoned that the plan: (1) was "designed to break down old patterns of racial
41 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
42 Id.
43 Manuel v. Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.Supp. 45,47 (D.C.Cir. 1980)(Finding "no evidence
of a congressional intent to create a private right of action under E.O. 11,246).
' 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.25 (2005).
4'41 C.F.R. § 60-1.27 (2005).
46 Id. at 351.
47 443 U.S. 193 (1979).48 Id. at 199-200.
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segregation and hierarchy"; (2) "d[id] not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
White employees," and (3) was a temporary measure intended to attain rather
than maintain racial balance.49 In 1989, however, the tide turned and made it
easier for individuals to bring reverse-discrimination lawsuits based on
affirmative action plans. In Martin v. Wilks ,5 the Court held that federal
procedural rules did not preclude White firefighters from challenging the
validity of an affirmative action plan adopted earlier with federal court approval
to settle lawsuits by Blacks alleging discrimination in hiring and promotion. In
Martin, White firefighters argued that the plan denied them promotions based
on their race, thus violating Title VII. 51 In a five to four decision, the Court
ruled that the White firefighters were not precluded from challenging
employment decisions taken pursuant to the affirmative action plan.52 "A
voluntary settlement.. .between one group of employees and their employer
cannot possibly 'settle', voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting claims of
another group of employees who do not join in the agreement., 53 Although the
Supreme Court failed to decide the merits of the reverse-discrimination claim,
this decision "cleared the way for future challenges to court-approved
affirmative action plans adopted to settle earlier civil rights lawsuits.
'" 54
In 1989, the Supreme Court rendered four other decisions55 that restricted
an employee's ability to recover for employment-related discrimination under
the current civil rights legislation, including section 1981 of the Civil Rights
49 ld. at 208. The EEOC has promulgated regulation regarding voluntary affirmative action
plans. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1608. 1-12 (1989).
50 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
51 Id. at 759-60.
52 Id. at 758-59.
51 Id. at 768.
54 BAGLEY, supra note 39, at 354.
55 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (regardless of how strong the
showing of a discriminatory effect, an employer is no longer required to prove that
discriminatory practices are required by a business necessity); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)(Holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not prevent racial
discrimination and harassment as it pertains to employment and other contracts, but barred
discrimination only in the formation of the employment contract.) This was interpreted not to
protect the employee from harassment or other discriminatory conduct by the employer or
coworkers once the employee was on the job, or against discriminatory firing; Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (Holding that the time limitation on challenges to a seniority
plan begins from the time the plan was adopted, not from the time the employee was harmed by
the plan.); and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Holding that employment
decisions motivated partially by intentional discrimination are permitted if the employer can
show that the same decision would have been made absent the same discrimination.).
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Act of 1866 and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.56 Political opposition
resulted in the introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1990.17 The 1990 Act
was intended to remedy inequities of the 1989 rulings. The intentions were "1)
to... restor[e] the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited [by the
recent Supreme Court] decisions; and 2) to strengthen existing protections and
remedies... [in an effort] to provide more effective deterrence and
adequate compensation for victims of discrimination. 58
Although Congress and the first Bush (George H.W. Bush, hereinafter
Bush I) administration agreed on the need for additional civil rights legislation,
they disagreed on the scope of protection and enforcement that should be
provided by the bill.59 Opponents expressed concern that the new act would
force employers to adopt hiring quotas to avoid discrimination suits.
60
President Bush I, threatened to veto any civil rights legislation that constituted a
"quota bill."6' The provision most concerning the Bush I administration was
the one requiring employers to show that practices resulting in a disparate
impact "bear a substantial and demonstrable relationship to effective job
performance." 62 Opponents claimed this provision would set impossible new
standards for businesses that would force employers to adopt "'a silent practice
of quota hiring and promotion' to avoid potential lawsuits.,
63
The bill passed the Senate 62 to 34 and passed the House 273 to 154.64 On
October 22, 1990, President Bush vetoed the bill.65 On October 24, 1990, the
Senate sustained the veto by a mere 66 to 34 vote, only one vote shy of the two-
thirds required to enact the bill over the presidential veto. 66 In his veto
message, President Bush said, "I deeply regret having to take this action with
respect to a bill bearing such a title, especially since it contains certain
56 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2004).
17 42 U.S.C. §2000a et. seq. (2004).
58 H.R. 4000, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990).
59 See Ann Devroy and Sharon LaFraniere, Bush Outlines Objections to Civil Rights
Proposal; President Says He won't Sign 'Quota Bill', WASH. POST, May 18, 1990, at A6.
60 Charles Fried, Hands in the Quota Cookie Jar, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1990, at A18.
61 Devroy, supra note 59, at A6.
62 Fried, supra note 60, at A18.
63 Michael Isikoff and Ann Devroy, Civil Rights Bill Veto Threatened; Scope of Federal
Employment Discrimination Laws is at Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1990, at A25.
64 L.A. Daily News. HI. October 10, 1990.
65i.
66 Steve McGonigle, Override of Bias-Bill Veto Fails; Close Vote in Senate Kills Measure
in 1990 Session, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Oct. 25, 1990. at 4A.
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provisions that I strongly endorse." 67 Bush pointed out that his version of the
bill would not result in quotas, but the Senate version would.68
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was introduced and signed by Bush into
legislation. 69 The successful forces behind the Act were in the climate of pro-
affirmative action groups, the "backlash" against the Clarence Thomas
nomination, and the "revulsion" against the David Duke race. 70 The Supreme
Court in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,71 another 1989 decision,
constitutionally struck down a minority-business set-aside program. In Croson,
the Supreme Court struck down the City of Richmond's Minority Business
Enterprise ("MBE") ordinance as a violation of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.7 2 In a six to three majority
decision, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to reject Richmond's
affirmative action program for minority businesses.73 The Court held that state
and local governments may implement an MBE program only if there is a
compelling governmental interest justifying the program (i.e., must show the
present effects of past discrimination in the marketplace), and must "narrowly
tailor" the programs to remedy the identified discrimination.74
The Richmond MBE ordinance failed under both prongs of the test.
Richmond's generalized assertions of discrimination and broad statistical
67 136 CONG. REC. S16418-02 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (Disapproval of S.2194).
68 id.
69 Pub. L.No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
70 David Duke has aspired to a U.S. Senate seat as recently as February of 1996.
Campaigning for his state's U.S. Senate seat last month, David Duke sounded
like a current, rather than an ex-Ku Klux Klansman. During an anti-affirmative
action rally at which supporters waved Confederate flags and sang "Dixie," Duke said
welfare and immigration policies "threaten to make [W]hite Americans the minority"
and announced: "I think the heartbeat of this country is the [W]hite majority...and I'm
speaking for them." Duke also proclaimed: "I hope you make it possible for me to go
to the U.S. Senate. I've come to symbolize [W]hite people who aren't going to take it
anymore.
William T. Coleman, Jr., Discrimination by Redistricting, WASH. POST, March 25, 1996, at
A17.
David Duke's agenda, when he restarted the Ku Klux Klan in 1975 included ending
affirmative action, weltare, and non-White immigration. David Waters, Forum Speaks Up
Against Religious Right, The Commercial Appeal, March 25, 1996, at B 1.Need this source from
author.
71 488 U.S. 469 (1989).721d. at 511.
71 See id.
74 Id. at 509.
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comparisons of disparities in contract awards to minorities versus percentages
of minorities in the general population were deemed insufficient proof of
discrimination.75 Additionally, Richmond's program was not narrowly tailored
since it benefited classes of minorities for whom there are no specific evidence
76of discrimination. Therefore, the Court found no rational basis for the size of
the set-aside goal, no logical ending point for the program, and no
consideration given to the use of less restrictive race-neutral remedies. 77 Thus,
the Court established the requirement for an individual wrong that can be
corrected, but not for a societal wrong that needs correcting. Perhaps, this
impliedly suggests that Congress, not the Court, is the path for correcting
societal wrongs.
The Croson decision prompted additional litigation and has negatively
affected many state and local programs seeking to improve marketplace access
for minority-owned businesses.78 The Minority Business Enterprise Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (MBELDEF) reported sixty-eight cases in
twenty-seven states affected by Croson reasoning. 79 In the aftermath of
Croson, thirty-one jurisdictions and governmental entities in seventeen states
have taken steps to voluntarily dismantle their race and gender-conscious MBE
policies and programs without any litigation being filed.80 Additionally, ninety-
one jurisdictions in twenty-seven states examined the presence of racial and
sexual discrimination in the public and private marketplace sectors by
reviewing and re-evaluating the programs. 81 By 1994, thirty-six of fifty states
had included jurisdictions negatively affected by Croson.
82
71 Id. at 506.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 510-11.
78 Courtney Billups, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,
The Effect of Richmond v. Croson and Similar Attacks on Federal, State and Local MIW/DBE
Programs Nationwide, 1-2, April 4, 1994.
79 Id. at 3-24.
80 Id. at 25-26. States affected include: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
81 Id. at 26. The following states include jurisdictions that are reviewing and re-evaluating
the programs, by inter alia, conducting studies and/or holding public hearings: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
82 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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Similarly, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena" has generated similar
complaints attacking federal set-aside programs. In Adarand, a non-
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) guardrail subcontractor brought suit
in the U.S. District Court for Colorado attacking the constitutionality of the
federal DBE program on its face and as applied by the Colorado Department of
Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration. 84 Federal District
Court Judge Carrigan ruled that Croson does not apply to these laws because
they are congressionally mandated, and Congress is specifically empowered by
the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in affirmative action to remedy
discrimination. 85 Thus, the District Court upheld the constitutionality of the
DBE program as applied under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.86
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.87 The Supreme Court identified Croson as the proper
standard to be applied.88  Relying on Croson, Adarand argued that the
administering agency must make specific findings of past discrimination. 89 As
of February 20, 1996, eleven complaints asserting violations of the equal
protection clause had been filed against federally funded set-aside programs.
More recently, the Supreme Court decided two cases in 2003 that had an
effect on race- based discrimination, Grutter v. Bollinger9" and Gratz v.
Bollinger.9' In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School denied
admission to Barbara Grutter, a White female Michigan resident with a 3.8
GPA and a LSAT score of 161.92 Grutter claimed that the law school had
"discriminated against her based on race in violation of the 14 th Amendment,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . Her primary
contention was that the law school used race as a major factor in determining
admission and gave applicants belonging to certain minority groups a
significantly greater chance for acceptance. 94 She further argued that there was
83 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Id. at 204.
85 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 243-44 (D. Colo. 1992),
affirmed, Adarand v. Pena, 16 F.3rd 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated by 515 U.S. 200 (1995).86 Id. at 240.
87 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210 (1995).
88 I.
89 See id.
90 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
91 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
92 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316 (2003).




no compelling interest to justify the use of race.95 The District Court found the
law school's use of race unlawful; however, it was reversed by the Sixth
Circuit, which held that diversity was a compelling interest and the law
school's program was narrowly tailored.96 The issue before the Supreme Court
was "whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University
of Michigan Law School is unlawful."97 The Supreme Court held that the law
school's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.98
In Gratz, Jennifer Gratz, a White Michigan resident, was denied admission
to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and Arts along
with several other applicants. 99 Gratz and the other applicants filed a class
action suit, alleging that the racial preferences used in the admissions process
by the university was discriminatory and violated the Equal Protection Clause,
Title VI, and § 1981. 1" The District Court held for the university with respect
to the current admission guidelines; however, it held for the denied applicants
with respect to the admissions guidelines from 1995-1998 since they were
equivalent to a quota.10' The issue that the Supreme Court addressed was
whether the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in
undergraduate admissions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.102
The Supreme Court held that the university's admissions policy was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted interest in diversity.
10 3
The Supreme Court has drastically changed the manner in which race
based classifications have been (reviewed, viewed) throughout the history of
the United States. Despite these changes, Blacks are still discriminated against
and the affirmative action measures that are needed to correct this "wrong"
must be upheld. Strict judicial scrutiny is the current standard even though
95 id.
96 Id.at 321.
97 Id. at 311.
98 Id. at 343.
99 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251.
1oo Id. at 252.
101 Id. at 258-59.
102 Id. at 250.
1"3 Id. at 251.
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Justice Thurgood Marshall believed that intermediate scrutiny would be
sufficient. 104
1II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIETAL WRONG OF FAILING TO
ACKNOWLEDGE BLACKS AS EQUAL
Prior to addressing remedies for the "wrong" of discrimination, a reiteration
of early legal reasoning that failed to acknowledge Blacks as equal is necessary.
The Supreme Court "has consistently 'repudiated distinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'" 0 5 Affirmative action
plans to remedy racial discrimination must withstand strict judicial scrutiny.
0 6
Equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a classification.10 7 "Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that
it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees."'' 0 8  A two-prong
examination has been set forth by the Court. 09 First, "any racial classification
104 Author's opinion after review Mashall's cases. Intermediate scrutiny is invoked when
the rights of a "quasi-suspect class" are at issue. The classification must be substantially related
to an important governmental objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464
(1980). Generally, intermediate scrutiny is applied to classifications such as illegitimacy and
sex. Intermediate scrutiny is the middle ground between strict scrutiny and the rational basis
test. Strict scrutiny is the standard of review set out in Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
This standard of review is used when the rights of a suspect class are at issue. There must be
substantial intrusion, or the action must interfere with fundamental rights, such as the right to
privacy. To pass strict scrutiny review, the action taken against these rights must be narrowly
tailored, and necessary to achieve permissible ends of a compelling interest. On the other end of
the spectrum is the rational basis test. The rational basis test begins with the presumption of
constitutionality, and follows that so long as there is a rational basis for the action to achieve
legitimate ends, the action stands. The rational basis test asks only, is this an appropriate means
to a [legitimate] end. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
105 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. at 267, 273, 2d 260 (1986), (quoting Loving,
388 U.S. at 11).
106 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291("Racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination.").
107 Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
'0' Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,491 (1980)).
109 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
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must 'be justified by a compelling governmental interest.' ' 0 Second, "the
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that goal."
'11
In Dred Scott v. Sanford,112 the Court held that Dred Scott, a Black
American slave, lacked standing to sue in federal court because he was not a
citizen under the Constitution. The following year, the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified creating the principles of "equal protection."'" 3  Plessy v.
Ferguson 114 continued the Court's failure to acknowledge Blacks' rights to
equal protection by holding a Louisiana statute that required Caucasians and
African-Americans to be furnished with separate accommodations (but
allegedly equal) on railway trains did not violate the Thirteenth 15 and
Fourteenth" 6 Amendments. In Plessy, the Court reasoned the statute had a
neutral effect on race and did not confer inferior status based on race." 7 This
remains known as the "separate but equal" treatment of African-Americans.
Here, Justice Harlan's dissent established the Constitution's "color blind"
principle. 1 8 It is interesting that the connotations of "color blind" have
mutated from being in favor of Afro-Americans to perhaps at best a neutral, to
negative, inference, not favoring Afro-Americans. So that now, "color blind" is
a code word for ignoring the past and acting as if color does not matter.' 19 In
110 Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
' Wygant, 476 U.S.274 (quoting Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 480).
112 60 U.S. 393(1857).
113 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
114 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115 The Thirteenth Amendment provides in part that: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, §. 1.
116 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part
that:"[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"' Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-48.
118 It is ironic that Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy has provided the "backdrop in the late
twentieth century for non-minorities attempting to strike down racial classifications that favor
minorities." Terrence M. Lewis, Standard of Review Under the Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection Component: Adarand Expands the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 34 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 325, 330 (1996).
119 John C. Duncan, Jr., The American 'Legal' Dilemma: Colorblind i/Colorblind I- The
Rules Have Changed Again: A Semantic Apothegmatic Permutation, 7 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L.
315 (2000).
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Brown v. Board of Education 2° the "separate but equal" doctrine was reversed
when the Court held that segregation of children in public schools based solely
on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 1
A Fifth Amendment 22 equal protection challenge to federal racial
classification arose in Korematsu v. United States.123 Fred Korematsu, an
American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in federal court for
violating a Civilian Exclusion Order of the United States Army. 124 The order
directed all person of Japanese descent to be excluded from military areas.125
The Court asserted that any legal restriction, which takes away the civil rights
of a single racial group, is to be viewed as "immediately suspect". 126 The court
ultimately reasoned that it would be impossible to separate loyal Japanese-
Americans from disloyal Japanese-Americans and excluding people of
Japanese descent from an entire area had a definite and close relationship with
the preclusion of sabotage. 127 Thus, the Court upheld the military's exclusion
order 12 8 (More on this general area infra at Section XI A).
120 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121 Id. at 493, 495.
122 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that:
"No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S.
CONST. amend.V.
123 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
124 Id. at 215-16.
125 Id. at 216.
126 Id. at 216. Additionally, the Court concluded that "pressing public necessity" can
sometimes allow the use of race based restrictions. Id.
127 Id. at 223-24.
128 Id. at 218. The convictions of Hirabayashi and Korematsu were overturned in coram
nobis actions. A writ of error coram nobis is a procedural tool which corrects errors of fact
only. Its function is to bring before the court rendering the judgment matters of fact which, if
known at the time the judgment was rendered, would have prevented its decision. The function
is to bring the error to the attention of the court and to obtain relief from errors of fact. The
essence of the common law remedy of coram nobis is that it is addressed to the very court which
renders the judgment in which injustice is alleged to have been done, in contrast to appeals or
review directed to another court. (The words 'coram nobis' means 'our court'.) BLACK'S LAW
DICnONARY 337 (6th ed. 1990). Here, the error of fact was based on newly discovered
documents showing that "government officials withheld evidence from the Supreme Court
indicating that the claims of military necessity for the internment program were questionable or
based on racial prejudice." Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41
STAN. L. REV. 61, 120 (1988). See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (91h Cir. 1987);
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). This issue will be thoroughly
discussed, infra.
BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL
In Boling v. Sharpe,129 the Court addressed race-based classifications. The
issue in Bolling was whether the federal government's segregation of public
schools in the District of Columbia violated the Fifth Amendment.1 30 The
Court held that racial segregation in public schools was not reasonably related
to any proper governmental objective and was a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 131 Chief Justice Earl Warren reasoned that the
concepts of "due process" and "equal protection" are not mutually exclusive.
132
Justice Warren further reasoned the discrimination of Boiling was
unreasonable and a denial of due process of law. The Court concluded that it
was "unthinkable" that the Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
federal government than that imposed on states in examining school
segregation. 133 The Court's standard of review combined rational basis review
and intermediate scrutiny review.134 Ultimately, the Court's acknowledgement
in Boiling of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component "presaged the
Court's reasoning in Adarand".135
The next Supreme Court opinion dealing with racial classifications was
Loving v. Virginia.136 The issue was whether a Virginia statute preventing
interracial marriages violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 137 The Court held that the statute was racially
129 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
130 id.
131 Id. at 499-500.
132 Id. at 499.
133 Id. at 500.
134 id.
135 Lewis, supra note 118, at 332. "Classifications not drawn on a suspect basis' are subject
to a 'low level' or 'rational basis' review and are usually upheld." Geoffrey R. Stone, et al.,
CONSTrrUnTONAL LAW 532-33 (2d ed. 1991). Under "rational basis review," the Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied if the classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Under intermediate scrutiny
review, classifications "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives to satisfy an equal protection challenge." Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)(concluding that classifications based on gender must satisfy an
intermediate scrutiny review.) Under strict scrutiny review, classifications must serve
"compelling governmental interests" and be "narrowly tailored" to the achievement of those
interests. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 at 220.
136 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
137 The Virginia Code provided in relevant part that "(i)f any [Wihite person intermarry
with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a [Wlhite person, he shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be punished ...for not less than one nor more than five years." VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-59 (1960)(repealed 1968). Virginia was one of sixteen states that had a statute
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discriminatory, and was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses. 138 Reasoning that the right to marry is a
fundamental right of all persons, the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause required that racial classifications be examined under "the most rigid
scrutiny."'
' 39
The next significant racial classification case examined by the Court was
Board of Regents of University of California v. Bakke in 1978.'40 In Bakke, the
University of California at Davis had created a special admissions program for
the medical school. 14 1 Sixteen of one hundred seats for each medical school
class were reserved for minority students.142 Bakke, a Caucasian male, was not
admitted by the medical school in either 1973 or 1974, in spite of a grade point
average and admission test scores that were higher than those of minorities
admitted under the school's special admissions program.1
43
The issue in Bakke was whether the race-based special admissions program
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 The
Court, failing to issue a majority opinion, "45 held that the medical school's
minority admissions program violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.' 46 Justice Powell reasoned that all racial and ethnic
classifications of any type are "inherently suspect... [and require] ... the most
exacting judicial examination. ' 147 Finding that the medical school failed to
establish that the race-based admissions program was adopted in response to
identified discrimination, Powell concluded the school failed to carry its burden
of proving a compelling governmental interest to satisfy strict scrutiny
review. 148 Taking a fatal turn away from achieving equal opportunity, Powell
concluded that
the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical
School perceived as victims of societal discrimination does not justify a
that prohibited marriages on the basis of racial classifications. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (citations
omitted). Lewis, supra note 118, at 330.
118 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
139 Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216).
'40 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
141 Id. at 275.
142 id.
143 Id. at 276-77.
'44 Id. at 320.
141 Id. at 269.
'46 Id. at 320.
147 Id. at 291 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216).
148 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309-10.
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classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who
bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special
admissions program are thought to have suffered.
49
Justice Powell sealed the fatal reasoning that a second "wrong" is not
justified to ultimately create a "right." Under this analysis, even when students
are not on equal ground, a second "wrong" is not justified; therefore, equality
can never be achieved.
More recently, Hopwood v. State of Texas150 has acted as the latest
manifestation of incomplete logic and inconsistent legal reasoning. In
Hopwood, Judge Sparks acknowledged affirmative action as "one of the most
divisive issues faced by society, '"15 1 recognizing the case as highlighting the
tension when the individual rights of non-minorities conflict with programs
designed to aid minorities. In Hopwood, "non-minority applicants challenged
the state university law school's affirmative action admission program as
violating equal protection." 52 "The plaintiffs [] contended that any preferential
treatment... based on race violated the Fourteenth Amendment and [was]
therefore unconstitutional." 153 Judge Sparks reasoned,
such a simplistic application of the Fourteenth Amendment would ignore the
long history of pervasive racial discrimination in our society that the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to remedy and the complexities of
achieving the societal goal of overcoming the past effects of that
discrimination. Further, the Supreme Court, which is continually faced with
trying to reconcile the meaning of words written over a century ago with the
realities of the latter twentieth century, has declined to succumb to an original
intent or strict constructionist argument. Therefore, the [c]ourt will decline
the plaintiffs invitation to ignore the law established by the highest court of
this land and to declare affimnative action based on racial preference as
unconstitutional per se.154
149 d.at 310.
150 861 F. Supp. 551 (W. D. Tex. 1994), reversed by 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001).
151 Id. at 553.
151 Id. at 551.
151 Id. at 553.
154 Id. Judge Sparks identified the pervasiveness of discrimination in the history of Texas's
educational system. "Even after Brown v. Board of Education, the State of Texas adopted a
policy of 'official resistance' to integration of its public schools [which] resulted in numerous
lawsuits and court-imposed desegregation plans throughout the past twenty years." Id. at 554
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The court identified the issue as whether the affirmative action program
met the legal standard required to "pass constitutional muster," and found that
it did not.155 The legal standard here is the strict scrutiny test. 156 However, the
court acknowledged the reasoning behind affirmative action:
The reasoning behind affirmative action is simple - because society has a long
history of discriminating against minorities, it is not realistic to assume that
the removal of barriers can suddenly make minority individuals equal and
able to avail themselves of all opportunities. Therefore, an evaluation of the
purpose and necessity of affirmative action in Texas's system of higher
education requires an understanding of past discrimination against Blacks and
Mexican Americans, the minorities receiving preferences in this cause, and
the types of barriers these minorities have encountered in the educational
system.1
57
(citations omitted). "The problem of segregated schools is not a relic of the past. Despite the
fact that the public school population is approximately half White and half minority, minority
students in Texas attend primarily majority-minority schools while White students attend
primarily White schools." Id. (citations omitted). "[A]t each educational level there is a marked
decline in the level of attainment by minorities, as reflected in comparison of drop-out rates
between minorities and non-minorities and the percentages of the respective groups that
graduate from high school and college." Id. at 554. "In 1990, the percentage of persons age 25
or older who completed high school was 81.5% non-Hispanic White, 66.1% Black, and 44.6%
Hispanic." Id. at n.3 (citations omitted), "College graduate rates for the same year reflect 25.2%
non-Hispanic Whites, 12% Black, and 7.3% Hispanic." Id. (citations omitted).
155 Id. at 554.
156 Id. at 568.
157 Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 554-55. Acknowledging discrimination against Blacks in
Texas history of higher education, Sparks noted that "Texas, by constitution and statute,
required 'separate schools...for the [W]hite and colored children"' until 1969. Id. at 554; see
TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1925, repealed 1969). This resulted in the establishment of inferior
segregated schools for Blacks. Additionally, college opportunities available to Blacks were
limited. Id. at 555.
The Texas Legislature created Prairie View State Normal & Industrial College
for Colored Teachers at Prairie View (now Prairie View A & M University) for the
education of "students to be taken from the colored population of this State." Until
1947, it remained the only state-supported institution of higher learning option to
Black students in Texas; no type of professional training was available to Blacks. In
1947, to avoid integration of the University of Texas, the Texas Legislature created
the Texas State University for Negroes (now Texas Southern University).
Id. (citations omitted).
In 1946, when a Black man, Herman Sweatt, was refused admission to University of Texas
Law School, a Texas court, holding that Article VII, § 7 of the Texas Constitution precluded his
admission, ordered the state to provide a law school for Blacks. See Sweatt v. Painter, 210
S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), reversed by 339 U.S. 629 (1950). "The state hastily created
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Although the impact of a long history of discrimination against Blacks is
acknowledged, the outcome of the legal reasoning is rapidly evolving in the
opposite direction. In Croson, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state
and local governments. 58 Although the Croson Court did not address the
standard of review the Fifth Amendment would require for action by the federal
government, the Court's reasoning in cases through Croson15 9 has established
three general propositions with regard to racial classifications in governmental
areas: skepticism, 16° consistency, 161 and congruence.162 All components must
be considered. "Taken together, these propositions lead to the conclusion that
any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental
actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny." 
163
While interpreting the level of "scrutiny" appropriate in Hopwood, the
District Court rejected the University of Texas' argument relying on Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC. 164 "In Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme Court held that
federally mandated affirmative action plans are subject to intermediate scrutiny-
-a determination whether the plans serve important governmental objectives
and whether they are substantially related to the achievement of the
objectives., 165  The University of Texas argued that its plan should be
considered a federal mandate because it stemmed from the Office of Civil
Right's (OCR) "insistence on full compliance with Title VI, an objective that is
a makeshift law school that had no permanent staff, no library staff, no facilities, and was not
accredited." Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 555 (citing Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632 (1950)). Finally,
in 1950, a unanimous United States Supreme Court ruled that the State of Texas'
provisions regarding the legal education of [Wihite and minority students violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and ordered that Sweatt be admitted to the previously all-
[W]hite University of Texas School of Law. Sweatt left the law school in 1951
without graduating after being subjected to racial slurs from students and professors,
cross burnings, and tire slashings.
Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 555 (citing Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636).
' Croson, 488 U.S. at 495, 509.
'59 Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, at 222, quoting_Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
160 "'Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination,"' Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74.
161 "[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification," Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
162 "Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the
Fourteenth Amendment" Buckley v. Valero, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1975).
163Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, at 224, quoting Croson 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
'64 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
165 Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 568, quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565.
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within the power of Congress." 66 The District Court distinguished Hopwood
from Metro Broadcasting. "In Metro [Broadcasting], the FCC's minority
ownership programs had been specifically mandated and approved by
Congress."' 167 Although Congress has the power to identify and redress the
effects of discrimination and has charged the Department of Education with
assuring compliance with Title VI, there is no similar congressional mandate in
this cause. Further, the FCC is a licensing body that established specific
minority ownership policies pursuant to a congressional mandate. "[The OCR]
has ... not.. .required the State to adopt any specific procedures."'' 68 Thus, the
University of Texas was penalized.
The District Court further distinguished equal protection analysis.
"[U]nder equal protection analysis, the same level of scrutiny applies to race-
conscious affirmative action plans adopted pursuant to consent agreement as to
other voluntarily adopted plans." 169 Citing Podberesky v. Kirwan 17 as a more
recent circuit court opinion analyzing an educational affirmative action plan, "a
scholarship plan adopted in response to protracted litigation and OCR
guidelines, upheld the lower court's application of strict scrutiny as the proper
standard for review of the plan.'
171
The most compelling justification for application of strict scrutiny is to
provide assurance that individual rights are afforded the full protection they
merit under the Constitution. Only by applying strict scrutiny can a court
honestly weigh the validity and necessity of efforts to remedy past wrongs
against the rights of otherwise qualified non-minorities affected by the effort.
Although the use of racial classifications is disfavored, there are instances
when such classifications serving proper purposes should be upheld. Only
through diligent judicial examination can a court determine if a classification
is consistent with constitutional guarantees and not related to "illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Accordingly, the Court
concludes that the law school admissions process must be subjected to a strict
scrutiny test under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
166id.
167 Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 558.
168 Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 568-69.
169 Id. at 569.
170 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
171 Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 569.
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to protect both the integrity of the process and the important individual rights
at issue.' 
72
IV. Two NEGATIVES Do MAKE A POSITIVE OR TWO WRONGS DO MAKE A
RIGHT: THE MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
"[T]he Court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as
well as bar like discrimination in the future."
Hugo L. Black
173
To appreciate the legal analogy and to understand the rationale for
incomplete logic set forth in this article, a brief review of mathematical theory
is necessary. The collection of real numbers includes natural numbers,
integers, rational numbers, and irrational numbers. Real numbers can be
represented on a number line such that each point on the line corresponds to
exactly one real number and each real number corresponds to one point on the
line. When the number zero is placed, the positive numbers are placed at
regular intervals to the right of zero, and the negative real numbers are placed at
regular intervals to the left of zero. 174 The natural numbers, also called positive
integers, go on indefinitely. The number two is placed one unit to the right of
one on the number line, the number three is placed one unit to the right of two,
and so on.175 For every real number, a, there is a real number, -a, called the
additive inverse, such that a + (-a) = (-a) + a = 0. Here, -a is called the negative
of a.
176
Additionally, properties of equalities must be recognized. Merely adding a
number to both sides of an equation preserves the equality. Likewise, adding a
number to both sides of an inequality preserves the inequality.177 Multiplying
an inequality by a positive number preserves the inequality.1 78 Therefore,
incorporating these theories and importing them to our legal reasoning we have:
- a- a=0
172 Id. (emphasis added).
173 Lousiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
174 STANLEY I. GROSSMAN, ALGEBRA & TRIGONOMETRY 3 (2nd ed. 1992).
171 Id. at 3-4.
176 Id. at 7.
'77 Id. at 15.
171 Id. at 16.
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This implies that when the total amount of something if fixed (T=law
school openings) then the quantity devoted to one thing (B=Black students)
must be balanced by less than the fixed amount being devoted to the other thing
(W=White students). This may be represented mathematically in the following
equations:
T=W- B
T- B=W- B- B
T- B=W
Likewise, in another area of mathematics, by simply multiplying two
negatives, one yields a positive. Thus reinforcing the analogy of two negatives
can/do make a positive.
Additionally, a brief acknowledgement of mathematical theory is useful.
Mathematical philosophers acknowledge both a priori knowledge and empirical
knowledge. 179 A priori, attainable prior to experience, and empirical, based on
experience, have distinctions.1 80 "Empirical concepts [are] held to be ideas that
have been 'abstracted' by the mind from what is 'given' in sense experience,
while a priori concepts are held to be ideas not acquired by the mind in that
manner." 181 A priori knowledge, then, exists independently and does not need
to be justified by experience.182 In reality, not every legal reasoning situation or
mathematical equation fits into one exclusive category. 83 However, when
179 STEPHEN F. BARKER, PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS, 3 (1964).
In addition to the distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge,
philosophers have also concerned themselves with another related distinction
between analytic and synthetic knowledge. This distinction was introduced
into philosophy by the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel
Kant, and [remains controversial. Kant used the notion of judgment] when
trying to explain his distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge.
Kant's view [is] to know something, or even have a belief of any kind, is to
have made a judgment. [That] judgment may have been made consciously or
unconsciously.... Kant [acknowledges the] two different sorts ofjudgments:
... synthesis, the act of putting together things that are uncombined and
different, and analysis, the act of separating out from something a component
that was present in it.
Id. at7.
so Id. at 3.
181 Id.
1812 Id. at 4-5.
183 In the author's opinion, the courts have followed this reasoning in holding that statistics
are persuasive but not dispositive of discrimination.
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existing knowledge is a priori, not merely justified by experience, then
deduction can be applied. "Deduction is reasoning in which we can know a
priori that if no logical mistake has been made and if the premises are true, then
the conclusion will have to be true also." 184 Therefore, when dealing with a
finite set, remedying or balancing one "negative," or imposing a "wrong,"
requires compromise. This compromise, one can deduce, creates a second
"negative" or "wrong".
In physics, the concept of "two negatives equal a positive" can also be
inferred. The difference in physics, however, is that the "positive" is a state of
equilibrium, or a state of balance. 185 Consider first a pendulum. If a bob is
suspended vertically from its support, it will remain motionless. This is the
pendulum's equilibrium position. If a pendulum is set in motion, it swings
back and forth. While a pendulum is swinging back and forth, it is not in
equilibrium - as the motion of the pendulum carries it past the rest position, the
restoring force on the bob accelerates the bob so that it is redirected towards the
rest position. The bob will continue to swing through the equilibrium point, to
a maximum displacement on the other side, until it comes to a complete rest,
and thus the cycle repeats. The restoring force is needed to bring the pendulum
back to its rest position.
After pendulum is set in motion, it swings back and forth until it once again
achieves equilibrium, see Figure 1.
This principle is similarly demonstrated in Hooke's Law.1 86 Hooke's Law
states that the restoring force due to a spring, is proportional to the length that
the spring is stretched, and it acts in opposite direction.1 87 In order to achieve
equilibrium, the spring must return to the rest position.
188
184 BARKER, supra note 179, at 5.
185 This is in the author's conception/understanding of physics.
1
86 See WILLIAM P. CRUMMETT AND ARTHUR B. WESTERN. UNIVERSITY PHYSICS: MODELS
AND APPLICATIONS 108 (1994). When a spring is stretched it exerts a restoring force in direct
proportion to the amount of stretch. When a string is compressed the restoring force increases









Figure 1. Pendulum in Motion
Examining kinematics, 189 we are presented with another theory of physics
in which equality is sought. Newton's First Law states that an object in motion,
will remain in constant motion until acted upon by an outside force. 19 If a
force in the direction opposing motion is applied over an appropriate time
interval, the object will come to rest. 191 For example, if a ball is thrown directly
up into the air, the force of gravity gradually slows the velocity of the ball until
it reaches its maximum height, at which time the ball has an instantaneous
speed equal to zero, prior to traveling back towards the earth. Newton's Third
Law states that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.19 In
the sport of tennis, the tennis player swings the racket in order to strike the
oncoming ball. Action/Reaction forces exist such that the player's racket
strikes the ball and in return, the ball strikes the player's racket.
Newton's Laws are analogous with the concept of affirmative action
programs in colleges. As in Newton's First Law, Whites will continue to be the
majority in colleges until acted upon by an outside force. By instigating
affirmative action programs over a period of time, the continued control of the
White majority will cease to exist, leaviog an equal, resting state of racial
composition. Likewise, as in Newton's Third Law, it is necessary that for
189 Kinematics is the study of the motion. interview with James A. Hilty, 1. Mr. Hilty is a
engineering physicist currently teaching for the non-profit Teach for America program in Baton
Rouge, LA.
190 In the 17
th century, Isaac Newton developed his Three Laws of Motion. For the
purposes of this article, there is no need to examine Newton's Second Law of Motion. Id.
191 Id.192 id.
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equality in education to occur, an equal or opposite force must be applied. This
force is the alleged "wrong" of affirmative action. Equality in education cannot
occur without the opposite force of programs of assistance and opportunities for
minorities. Thus, in physics, as mathematics, two "negatives" can/do equal a
"positive."
V. STATISTICAL PROBABILITY: ACHIEVING EQUALITY WITHOUT IMPOSING
A SECOND WRONG?
So-called formal equal opportunity has done a lot but misses the heart of the
problem. It put the vampire back in its coffin, but it was no silver stake. The
rules may be color-blind but people are not. The question remains, therefore,
whether the law can truly shed, or exist apart from the color-conscious society
in which it exists, as a skeleton is devoid of flesh; or whether law is the
embodiment of society, either the creation or the reflection of a particular
citizenry's arranged complexity of relations.
193
Wrong-"a violation of the legal rights of another; an invasion of right to
the damage of the parties who suffer it, especially a tort.
194
The definition of equality has remained a subject of debate.'
95
Additionally, measures of equality and equal opportunity are controversial.
The Supreme Court has recognized three methods by which the plaintiff can
attack the exclusionary effect of hiring practices. The methods include
193 Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay of Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICHIGAN L. REv. 2128, 2142 (1989).
194 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990).
195 United Steelworkers of America, 443 U.S. at 232.
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its activity
to correcting abuse, now promoting equality with mathematical certainty.
In this regard, nothing in the title permits a person to demand
employment... .Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must
not be interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required
in discrimination practices. Its primary task is to make certain that the
channels of employment are open to persons regardless of their race and
that jobs in companies or membership in unions are strictly filled on the
basis of qualification. The Republican supporters of the bill concluded their
remarks on Title VII by declaring that "[a]ll vestiges of inequality based
solely on race must be removed..... Therefore, this argument was limited to
removing the obstacle to the opportunity for equality, not promoting
equality.
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applicant flow analysis, population comparison analysis, and requirement effect
analysis.' 96 The Court, however, "has refused to endorse one particular
method." 197  The Supreme Court explained the value of statistics in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States'98 as "probative in a
case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of
purposeful discrimination." ' 99 Perhaps this is another way of saying: where
there is smoke, there is fire. The purpose of statistical analysis was therefore
interpreted as useful only "to probe such motivation and not to require
employers to maintain a balanced work force."
200
Here statistics are introduced in a different fashion and for a different
purpose. The reason for presenting the following analysis is to simply show
that equality cannot be achieved without creating an alleged "second wrong."
Social Scientist Robert Klitgaard calculated that in one year, in the 1970's,
if affirmative action had been eliminated, the total number of Blacks in law
school in America would have dropped from 1,539 to 285.20' This presumably
meant that the total number of Whites would have risen by the same number. 202
In 1971, Marco DeFunis, one of the "discriminated-against" Whites, sued.203
The University of Washington law school had rejected DeFunis
even though his grades and test scores put him ahead of virtually all the Black
students who were accepted. DeFunis won his case and entered the law
school under a court order. The Washington State Supreme Court reversed
the decision and ordered him out. DeFunis appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, 204
which agreed to hear the case. As a result, the lower-court decision was
stayed, permitting him to remain in law school.205
196 Not based on a specific source, but rather the author's opinion after research.
197 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN Er AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 125 (1994).
198 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
199 Id. at 340.
'0 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 197, at 125.





205 Id.; See also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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William 0. Douglas, the longest-serving member of the Supreme Court in
American history, seemingly struggled with the concept of remedying past
wrongs in his famous dissent.2°6 Douglas acknowledged the potential bias the
LSAT might have on those with diverse cultural backgrounds. °7
206 See Lemann, supra note 201, at 52.
Douglas's papers, now opened, provide some insight to this struggle. Douglas, then 75
years old, "was himself the product of humble origins in the state of Washington; his own
meteoric rise has been set off by admission to law school." Id. He was "a fiery liberal and
champion of the downtrodden who had come down on the side of Blacks in every landmark
civil rights case." Id. One of Douglas's clerks wrote him a memo recommending he vote to take
up the DeFunis case because "there really was some kind of quota here," which he thought was
a wrong that ought to be corrected. Id. The Court granted DeFunis a hearing and then recessed.
When Defunis was only weeks from law school graduation the justices began working on their
opinions again. Four justices wanted to kick DeFunis out of law school, four wanted to order
his admission. It was apparent that Douglas would be the crucial swing vote. Douglas, known
for his quick, decisive nature, seemed "genuinely torn." Id. "I don't know about these tests,"
Douglas told Ellman, one of his clerks. Douglas was questioning if the Law School Aptitude
Test was biased against Blacks. "Before putting Ellman in charge of the opinion, Douglas had
dashed off some wording, dated [M]arch 8, 1974, that said the L.S.A.T. was "by no means
objective" and might contain "hidden bias." Id. Ellman obtained data from the Educational
Testing Service that the L.S.A.T. did not inaccurately predict Blacks' grades. Id. Douglas's
early wording opposed reverse discrimination. "The democratic ideal as I read the Constitution
and Bill of Rights presupposes an aristocracy of talent, and all races must be permitted to
compete for a position in that hierarchy," it said. Id. Douglas went on to propose that the law
school first admit "those clearly qualified" purely on academic merit and then fill the rest of its
places by a lottery. Id. Then, on March 11, the justices decided to declare the case moot since
DeFunis was about to graduate and no clear majority position was emerging. Douglas,
however, chose to produce a dissent that addressed the merits of the case. He told Ellman, "I
might not be around next time this issue comes up." Id. On March 21, there was another draft
of Douglas's opinion arguing that the school should be allowed to admit minorities with lower
test scores than Whites who were rejected. However, the next day, there was another draft
taking a different position. While "racial classifications cannot be used," universities should
discriminate in favor of people from disadvantaged backgrounds. Id. The next draft, indicated
an opposition to racial preferences was emerging. Another draft said, "The presence of an
L.S.A.T. test is sufficient warrant for a school to separate minorities into a class in order better
to probe their capacities and potentials." Id. Douglas instructed Ellman to circulate this draft to
the other justices. But, the following morning, called Ellman to his office and said he actually
had not wanted the draft circulated. After Ellman retrieved the copies from the justices' offices,
Douglas told him that "from now on he would work on the opinion without any help." Id. He
then wrote one last draft, "rather than coming down on one or another side of the case, he came
down on both at the same time. He was strongly against reverse discrimination, but insisted that
DeFunis had not been discriminated against on the basis of his race when he was denied
admission. So, for the first time in all the drafts, he did not order DeFunis admitted to law
school." Id. Douglas seemed to arrive at his final position by turning his attack on the L.S.A.T.
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The key to the problem is the consideration of each application in a racially
neutral way. Since the LSAT reflects questions touching on cultural
backgrounds, the Admissions Committee acted properly in my view in setting
minority applications apart for separate processing. These minorities have
cultural backgrounds that are vastly different from the dominant Caucasian.
Many Eskimos, American Indians, Filipinos, Chicanos, Asian Indians,
Burmese, and Africans come from such disparate backgrounds that a test
sensitively tuned for most applicants would be wide of the mark for many
minorities. The melting pot is not designed to homogenize people, making
them uniform in consistency. The melting pot as I understand it is a figure of
speech that depicts the wide diversities tolerated by the First Amendment
under one flag.. .Minorities in our midst who are to serve actively in our
public affairs should be chosen on talent and character alone, not on cultural
orientation or leanings.208
My view is only that I cannot say by the tests used and applied he was
invidiously discriminated against because of his race. I cannot conclude that
the admissions procedure of the Law School of the University of Washington
that excluded DeFunis is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.209
Even legal scholars of great character and capacity have struggled with
this logic.
VI. REMEDIES: AN OVERVIEW EN BREVE
Remedy-"the means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a
wrong; legal or equitable relief.
210
In layman's terms, a remedy is the type and amount of relief "to which a
party may be entitled.,, 21 First, there are two broad categories of remedies:
"It is racially biased, he wrote; its bias justifies reverse bias by the law school; in fact, the
L.S.A.T. should be abolished entirely. That Douglas decided to declare the L.S.A.T. biased
although he had no evidence that it was is mainly a demonstration that he was intellectually
trapped and couldn't find any other way out." Id. One year later, Justice Douglas had a stroke
and retired from the Court. in 1977, a case almost exactly like DeFunis rose to the Supreme
Court: Bakke v. Regents of the University of California. Id.
207 id.
208 DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 334 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
2 Id. at 344.
210 BLACK's LAW DICTnONARY 1296 (7th ed. 1999).
211 ELAINE W. SHOBEN, Er AL., RMREDIEs, CASES AND PROBLEMS 2 (3d ed. 2002).
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remedies at law and remedies in equity.2 12 Remedies at law are remedies that
go against the property of a person.213 Remedies in equity are remedies that go
against the person.214 "There are four basic types ... of remedies: (1) coercive
remedies, (2) damages, (3) restitution, and (4) declaratory relief.,
215
A. Coercive Remedies
Coercive remedies are available from a court in equity, meaning that a
judge will determine whether the party "is entitled to the 'extraordinary relief
of an order commanding the defendant to do or refrain from doing specific
acts. 216 These types of remedies are supported by the contempt power of the
court, which permits a judge to jail a disobedient party for the "willful
disobedience of the order."217 Coercive remedies are most likely going to be
"an injunction or specific performance. ''218 There are four types of injunctions:
(1) preventive injunctions, (2) restorative injunctions, (3) prophylactic
injunctions, and (4) structural injunctions. 219 A preventive injunction is one
that prevents a future action by the defendant.220 A restorative injunction is one
that undoes "the effects of a past wrong."221 A prophylactic injunction is one
that "seeks to safeguard the plaintiff's rights by directing the defendant's
behavior so as to minimize the chance that wrongs might recur in the future.,
222
Finally, a structural injunction is one where the court gets involved "in the
institutional policies and practices of the defendant entit[y]. 223  Specific
performance, on the other hand, occurs when the court orders the defendant to
specifically perform a certain action.224
In determining whether or not to grant an injunction, Courts have adopted a
four part test: (1) is there irreparable harm?, (2) can the harms be balanced?, (3)
212 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 1.2 (2d ed. 1993).
213 Id.
214 id.
215 SHOBEN, supra note 211, at 2.
216 id.
217 Id. at 3.218 Id. at 2.





224 Id. at 86-87.
548 [Vol. 43
2004-051 TWO "WRONGS" DO MAKE A RIGHT
what is the plaintiffs probability of success?, and (4) what is the public
interest?.225
While there are several factors to be looked at by the court, there are also
several defenses that can prevent an injunction or specific performance from
being granted. The first is unclean hands, which means that the plaintiff had
committed some intentional act that prevents them from being completely
innocent, but usually the court must be offended before this defense will
apply. 226 The second defense is duress. If the defendant was acting under
duress from the plaintiff, a court may not grant a remedy to the plaintiff. In the
defense of duress, a plaintiff must have removed the free will of the defendant
and attempted to gain an unfair advantage. The third defense is
unconscionability, which combines unclean hands and duress. 227 This defense
only applies to contract actions.228 The fourth defense is estoppel, which means
the court will estop the plaintiff from receiving relief if there are actions
inconsistent with the rights the plaintiff is trying to assert. 229 The fifth defense
is waiver, which basically states that a plaintiff may waive her right to relief
and if she does so, then the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 210 The last
defense is laches. 23' Laches involves the barring of a plaintiff from bring an
232action due to unjust delay in bringing the action.
B. Damages
Damages are a remedy, the sole purpose of which is to compensate for
losses suffered in violation of one's rights. 2" Damages arise from two types of
actions: contract, 234 and tort.235 In contract actions, damages are usually
awarded based on the contractual arrangement and usually are awarded as
compensatory damages.236 Tort actions provide for harm to real property and
personal property, personal injury damages, and damages for injuries resulting




229 Id. at 126.
23 Id. at 155.
231 Id. at 126.
232 id.
233 Id. at 3.
234 Id. at 334.
235 Id. at 435.
236 Id. at 334.
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in death.237 Tort actions often lead to awards of punitive damages, or as they
are often referred to exemplary damages. 238 Punitive damages are awarded as
punishment for the defendant rather than to compensate the plaintiff.
239
Punitive damages are most often awarded for pain and suffering.24° The area of
damages is quite broad and due to the nature of this article, the author felt the
topic was worthy of mentioning, however it is also worthy of its own article.
C. Restitution
"The goal of restitution is to restore property to its rightful owner by
returning the plaintiff to a position held before a wrong or to disgorge from the
defendant any unjust enrichment occasioned by the wrong of the plaintiff."24'
Restitution is based on what the defendant gains.242 Unjust enrichment has
three basic elements. 43 First, the defendant must have gained something of
value.244 Second, he must have gained it at the plaintiff's expense. 245 Finally,
the circumstances are such that allowing the defendant to retain the benefit
would be unjust.246 There are also a few minor types of restitutionary remedies,




The main goal of declaratory remedies is to obtain a declaration of the
rights and obligation of the parties.248 The primary form of declaratory relief is
nominal damages.249 Often though, parties will seek a declaratory judgment
237 Id. at 435.
238 Id. at 704.
239 Id.
240°id.
241 Id. at 4.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 796-97.
244 Id. at 796.
245 Id. at 797.
246 id.
247 Id. at 4.
248 Id. at 4.
249 Id.
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that declares the rights or legal relations of the parties. 250 Declaratory relief
does not compensate a party.251
The remedy that Afro-Americans are seeking is redress for the wrongs
incurred during slavery and its derivative effects, as well as the wrongs incurred
for the unequal treatment as citizens. This article proposes that Blacks cannot
be equal until they are adequately and equally represented in professions that
require intense study on the graduate student level, such as the legal profession.
VII. PHILOSOPHY: A PROLEGOMENON AND A BRIEF GLIMPSE INTO THE
MIND OF SOCIETY AND A PHILOSOCIPHER
A. A Prolegomenon
Often various philosophical and ethical theories are placed in two camps:
the teleological and deontological.252  Teleological themes posit that the
rightness of an action is determined by its consequences. 253 Primary among
these theories is utilitarianism. 254 Teleological theories yield a relatively precise
and fairly objective decision-making method or approach by which
consequences are arrived at by a kind of cost benefit analysis amongst
alternatives. This often leads to a description of teleological utilitarian concepts
of whatever means to obtain a beneficial end for hopefully everyone. On the
other "side" are the deontological theories, which appear to ignore the
consequences, while highlighting or concentrating on the nature of actions or
rules from which actions derive. 255 Principles that appeal to human respect and




JOHN R. BOATRIGHT. ETHics AND THE CONDUCT OF BusiNEss 31 (4th ed. 2003).
253 Teleological derives from the Greek "telos" which means "end." The teleological
theories justify ends achieved as opposed to discernment or concern with actions themselves.
The idea is the greatest possible good for the greatest number. A question though emerges what
is good and for whom? Classical economic theory is broadly utilitarian.
254 "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness
Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the
absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." Utilitarianism, John
Stuart Mill (1863) at chapter 2.
255 Deontological is derived from the Greek word "deon" meaning "duty." Thus, these
theorists believed that actions are right due to the nature of the action or the rule followed to
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Interestingly utilitarianism posits that the interests of each and every person
be satisfied.256 That is, that the interest of everyone at least be included in this
calculation. Thus, classic utilitarianism only asks that the greatest good, in
essence, be for the greatest number of people.5 7 This then demands
impartiality. But who or what is the population? Who does "everyone"
include, or even not include? For example, should corporations be concerned
with societal welfare? Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are names
associated with teleological arguments and utilitarianism.
258
In contrast, deontological theories are favored in both human reason and
even more in the rightness of actions without regard to consequences.
Motivation is the gravamen, vice consequences, ends, or results. Immanuel
Kant is most strongly identified with this school of thought.259 Respect for
persons, a belief in various kinds of rights, plus obligations and duties, are the
foundations of the deontological approach.2 60 Natural rights, or human rights,
belong to humans essentially because they are human; because one exists, one
has inalienable rights as a human being.
The preceding was a dialogue leading to a very brief discussion of the
American philosopher John Rawls, and his egalitarian theory of justice, 261 and
262of Robert Nozick' s libertarian entitlement theory. Neither Rawls nor Nozick
fit neatly into the teleological or deontological "holes." In fact, even if one
tried to place them into "holes," they would be square pegs trying to fit into in
round "holes." Nozick is better known as a libertarian and Rawls is better
yield the action as opposed to a benefit or end for others or oneself. Of interest is the British
philosopher W. B. Ross, a deontological follower who posits as one of his seven moral rules,
the duty of reparations. Here the idea is to compensate persons for wrongs which were
wrongfully inflicted upon them. One could use them to support Afro-Americans who are
claiming reparations.
256 Mill, at chapter 2.
257 Id.
258 BOATRIGHT, supra note 252, at 34. See also Anthony Quinton, Utilitarian Ethics, New
York St. Martin's Press 1973.
259 BOATRIGHT, supra note 252, at 51. See also IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785). (As commented on in ROBERTPAULWOLFF, THE AUTONOMY
OF REASON (1973)).
260 BOATRIGHT, supra note 252, at 33.
2 61 BOATRIGHT, supra note 252, at 79. See also JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971);
ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1977).
262 ROBERT NoZIK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1979).
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known as an egalitarian.263 The discussion that follows attempts to assign them
to either side of the "two wrongs" precept that this article posits.
B. The Mind of Society
Rawls's theory dwells on a kind of egalitarian justice, which ironically
embodies the Kantian concept of equality.264 Rawls theorizes three principles.
(1) The principle of equal liberty - Each person has an equal right to a base set
of liberties that are compatible with a system of liberty for all.265 This is at once
deontological and teleological depending upon how one views it. (2) The
difference principle - This provides for an exception to the principle of equal
liberty if some unequal arrangement benefits the least well-off person.266 Thus,
an unequal allocation is acceptable if the worst-off person is better off with the
reallocation, than any other reallocation, especially the former.267 This leads us
towards the "two wrongs do/can make a right" direction. (3) The principle of
equal opportunity - Various employment positions and school enrollment
opportunities should be made available to everyone.268 Society has perhaps a
duty to offer everyone an equal opportunity to fill these positions or openings in
employment and schools by discounting differences of social condition or
birth. 269 This provides for a further tilt towards "two wrongs do/can make a
right." Thus, there is a more teleological wind.
This would appear to support the "two wrongs do/can make a right"
argument, especially as to race, gender, and nationality. Rawls three principles
of justice are met, even though the more just consequence may impact a few
negatively.
Now we shift to perhaps a more deontological approach through the
philosopher Robert Nozick. Nozick approaches justice through a historical
principle that accounts for the process by which allocation or distribution came
about 270 as opposed to the end result or consequences which Rawls emphasizes.
263 This is a general understanding based on both the writings of Nozick and Rawls.
264 RAwLS, supra note 261, at 150-51.
265 id.
26Id. at 151.
267 Id. at 150-61, 302. See also BOATRIGHT, supra note 252, at 81-4.
268 Id.
269 Id. At 81-4.
270BOATRIGHT, supra note 252, at 91. Nozick, to be fair, does call for just transfers, and
just original acquisitions. With these principles in mind, would he support affirmative action
since there were the original wrongs of slavery and segregation? He also believes in
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Thus, Nozick's aim appears to be the protection of rights as opposed to
equality of human well-being. In essence, it could be described as protecting
what is yours (entitlement, even by birth) or not allowing the state to interfere
with what one perceives as his.27 This certainly seems to lead to a backing of
"two wrongs do/can make a right."
Interestingly, Nozick and Kant, as well as Mills, Bentham, and Rawls, call
for, and support, the ideas of freedom. Kant, and perhaps Nozick in a
deontological frame, favor the protections of liberty, entitlement, and individual
rights, at the expense of utility, while Bentham, Mills, and Rawls, perhaps more
aligned with teleological principles, favor utility at the expense of freedom or
rights. The preceding discussion was merely a polemical predicate to the
possible philosophical and sociological protagonists for the argument in favor
of "two wrongs do/can make a right.",
272
The necessity of an in-depth philosophical examination of the duality of
remedies as both
"wrongs" and "rights," as well as the contrary views, are recognized by this
author; however, the following subsection is intended to give a brief overview
of two of the existing supportive theories that two "wrongs" can/do make a
"right," the sophist and the egalitarian.
C. A Sophists View: The Advantage of the More Powerful
Thrasymachus, the Greek sophist, claimed that the people who have the
most power impose social order on everyone else, "in every city the same thing
is just, the advantage of the established ruling body. It surely is master; so the
man who reasons rightly concludes that everywhere justice is the same thing,
the advantage of the stronger., 273 In Plato's Republic, Socrates refutes
Thrasymachus' s arguments by suggesting that the ruling body can mistake what
is best for themselves, thus creating a strong disadvantage, implying a lack of
rectification where there was original unjust appropriation by force or fraud. The question here
though is how about the innocent holder in due course of beneficiaries or original wrongs?
Nozick also tends to feel no obligation for the rich to aid the poor (See NoZICK, supra note 262,
at 265-68). That is, unless there were a voluntary obligation to aid the poor, which would point
the decision towards being a deontological decision.
271 BOATRIGHT, supra note 252, at 91. This is in essence Nozick's entitlement theory.
Summarized as "From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen." Justice is not for the
promotion of the well-being of mankind or equality, but for the protection of our rights. \
272 The author notes that obviously philosophy can be used by either side to support one's
position. See generally BOATRIGHT, supra note 252.
273 PLATO, THE REPUBuC BOOK 116 (Alan Bloom ed., Basic Books Inc. 1968).
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justice. While Socrates ultimately wins the argument, Thrasymachus's
statement is not without merit. The majority, or ruling class, tends to make
laws in such a way as to maintain an advantage over the minority, making it
impractical for the minority to overcome their disadvantage.
For a practical example, look to the impoverished child. A child is born
into an impoverished neighborhood. The child's parent/guardian(s) works two
jobs in order to provide food and shelter for the child; therefore, education is
not valued at home when compared with putting food on the table. The child
receives a minimal education at school due to inadequate funding. When the
child reaches an age where they can participate in the workforce, they are put to
the task of bringing money home for the family. With little importance placed
on education at home, and lack of enthusiasm within the school system itself,
the child will often not value education when compared with survival. When
the child reaches the age of adulthood, they are not in a position to leave the
family and focus on bettering themselves. They will continue working to
support a family, be it their own, or their extended family. Thus, the cycle
begins again. Thrasymachus's claim that the weaker, in this case the under-
educated, will be locked into the rule of the stronger, the better educated, is
reinforced. The question is then posed, when the minority has become the
victim of a cyclical suppression, how does one escape? Egalitarians offer a
solution.
D. Egalitarianism: Fixing the Problem: A Balancing Act
Egalitarians argue that governments should be motivated to make the move
from possessing an awareness of moral equality, to actually providing some
kind of equality in the lives of those they govern. Egalitarians suggest that by
more equally distributing money, political power, employment, and education,
members of society become more equal. How can equal distribution occur in a
capitalist society? If the very nature of a capitalist society is one of competition
for resources, how can the repressed minority, who has no resources with which
to begin, compete with the majority ruling class who controls the resources?
To equal the playing field, the resources must be redistributed. The only
way to redistribute limited resources is to move resources from one and
redistributp them tn nnother There ;c the nnalry of nniminqtinn anrl
eminent domain proceedings for "betterment" of an area. Certainly we hear the
hues and cries of "wrongs" in this area. Egalitarians suggest that affirmative
action programs may provide the answer. In aggressively enlisting the
members of the disadvantaged minority, and placing them in a better
competitive position with the advantaged majority, you are balancing the
2004-05]
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distribution of resources, and establishing equality. An Egalitarian does not
believe considering one's sex or race as a prerequisite for a position is an
injustice, especially in light of past injustice, but rather is a modification of
what qualities are important for that position, again with the past in mind,
resulting in the extant imbalance.
274
[G]roup identity and experience are so central a part of who we are and so
strongly affect how we perceive the world that it is important that there be a
variety of perspectives, so that all aspects of a situation are properly seen, and
the view of the majority or dominant group is not mistaken for objectivity or
universality.
275
Affirmative action often leads to a feeling of indignation held by the
majority towards the minority, thus establishing the concept of a "second
wrong." The majority may claim that by placing any one person above another
in order to atone for a past wrong is in a-sense discrimination, "So no matter
how attractive the end result of reverse discrimination may be it should be
unacceptable to someone committed to equality of opportunity as a
fundamental principle. 27 6  In this author's opinion, when applying an
egalitarian philosophy, this concept of a "second wrong" is not a strong enough
reason to justify allowing the advantaged ruling class to control the majority of
the resources, but rather is a rationale for the continuation of the current state of
affairs.
E. Philosociopher 277 An examination of Emile Durkheim's Consciousness
Collective
Emile Durkheim was a noted philosopher and sociologist. During his years
of study, Durkheim realized the importance of the interaction of the advantaged
274 It is acknowledged that there may be a few strict egalitarians that believe there can never
be true equality in a capitalist society. The thought in this article is not as egalitarian as in
communism, but egalitarian in the light of capitalism, yet avoiding or amending gross
imbalances because of race and gender. For example, where there was
preference/discrimination in the past, by a dominate group, there is now the need for balancing
and remedies which involve that same dominate group, towards the specific dominated group in
light of past injustice.
275 BRIAN Btx, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CoNTExT 230 (3d ed. 2004) quoting Drucilla
Cornell.
276 NIGEL WARBURTON, PHILOsoPHY: THE BASICS 75.
277 Philosociopher - (Phil-o-so-cee-off-er) a term used to describe Emile Durkheim, one of
the Fathers of Sociology, and the noted Philosopher who paved the way for functionalism.
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and the disadvantaged to create a consciousness collective, or the active mind
of society. Durkheim believed that by examining individual facts about society,
278social facts, you could come to understand society as a whole.
In his work Suicide,279 Durkheim notes that, "one does not advance when
one proceeds toward no goal, or -- which is the same thing -- when the goal is
infinity. To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn
oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness." A parallel emerges when
Durkheim's observation is applied to the sophist theory of the disadvantaged.
When vertical movement is suppressed by the control of the stronger, goals of
success appear so far away as to be unattainable. This also speaks to the issue
in terms of immediacy versus eventually, in regards to achieving equality in
terns of time. This is what the famous phrase from the Brown case was
alleging by putting forth "all deliberate speed., 280  Once again, if left to
continually recycle, there is no escape for the disadvantaged. When an
egalitarian theory is applied to Durkheim's observations, the cycle breaks
down. By offering an equal distribution of resources, goals of success no
longer appear to be unattainable.
The suppression that is faced by Afro-Americans can readily be applied to
Durkheim's theory. Faced with low incomes (see footnote 15), lack of proper
education, and fewer job opportunities, Blacks often find themselves with no
true attainable goal, in essence, spinning their wheels, but going nowhere,
while watching the majority "climb the ladder of success." So, without the
assistance of better jobs, better schools, and more money, how can Blacks be
expected to break "free?" The principles of affirmative action, or a "second
wrong," offers a way out.
278 "[A] category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of
manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a
coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control ver him." EMILE DuRKHEIM, THE RULES
OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 52 (1895).
279 EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (1897).
280 CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF




VII. A FACTUAL REVIEW OF THE PROPORTIONALITY: THE STATUS OF
BLACK LAWYERS
I do not believe in the law of hate. I may not be true to my ideals always, but
I believe in the law of love, and I believe you can do nothing with hatred. I
would like to see a time when man loves his fellow-man, and forgets his color
or creed. We will never be civilized until that time comes. I know the Negro
race has a long road to go. I believe the life of the Negro race has been a life
of tragedy, of injustice, of oppression. The law has made him equal, but man
has not [emphasis added]. And, after all, the last analysis is, what has man
done? and not what has the law done?
Clarence S. Darrow
2s1
Status - standing, state or condition; social position; the legal relation of
282individual to the rest of the community.
To further define our logic, the actual proportionality of Black lawyers in
the legal profession as the basis for demonstrating the incomplete logic of
advocating that justice can be achieved for Blacks without some compromise to
non-minorities will now be reviewed. The author is assuming that one mark of
equality will be when Blacks are proportionately represented. "The law has
made him equal but man has not.
283
After more than three decades of affirmative action programs, Black
lawyers are still not proportionally equivalent.28 The most dramatic increase in
total law school enrollment occurred during 1968 - 1971 .285 Enrollment of
Black students increased by 159% from 3,744 in 1971 to 5,955 in 1984.286 The
small proportion of Blacks with law degrees resulted from accumulated high
rates of attrition at each transition point of the educational process rather than
281 CLARENCE S. DARROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 229, 262 (Arthur Weinberg ed.,
University of Chicago Press 1957) summation in the Sweet cases, Detroit, 1926.
282 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (6th ed. 1990).
283 DARROW, supra note 281.
284 Charles L. Cappell, The Status of Black Lawyers, WORK AND OCCUPATIONS, Vol. 17,
Feb. 1990, at 101.
285 Id. at 104. The 94,408 students enrolled in 1971 represented 150% of the 1968
enrollment. The 1982 enrollment of 127,828 represented 135% of the 1971 total. However,
enrollment declined in 1983 and 1984.
286/id.
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from a drop in Black enrollment.287  Rates for the continuation of the
educational process from 1971 - 1980 were: 83% of Whites graduated from
high school, whereas only 72% of Blacks graduated from high school; 45% of
Whites versus 40% of Black graduates entered college; 56% of Whites versus
51% of Black college students eventually received a baccalaureate degree.288
Of these college graduates, an estimated 66% of Whites versus 61% of Blacks
entered graduate or professional school; and 59% of Black graduate students
versus 55% of White graduate students eventually earned their advanced
degree. 289 Black students are more likely to attend colleges with low admission
standards. 290 "Enrollment rates for Blacks in law school ... would have to
double to become proportional., 291 Completion rates also varied for Blacks.
During the 1970s, 85.1% of White students completed law school, compared to
only 77.4% of Blacks. Estimates of Black student three-year completion rates
in ABA-approved law schools from 1969 - 1977 averaged 72.7%.292
The statistical information in this section provides numbers and figures that
show that Blacks are not equally represented in law schools or the legal
profession, especially compared to White students. This statistical data is
necessary to show that society must improve the view it has of African
Americans. Society should no longer view African Americans as inferior or
unequal in terms of who can succeed in the legal profession. "The law has
made him equal, but man has not.
' 293
287 Id. at 106.
288 Id.
289 Id. (quoting A. W. Astin, Minorities in Higher Education, San Francisco, i 982, Fig. 1:
pp. 174-177).290 id.
291 Id. (quoting A. W. Astin, 1982, at 76).
292 Id. at 106 (quoting R. R. Smith, Great Expectations and Dubious Results: A
Pessimistic Prognosis for the Black Lawyer, BLACK LAW JOURNAL, 7, at 107).
293 DARROW, supra note 281.
2004-05]
BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL
IX. WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO ACHIEVE PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION? PROJECTION OF BLACK LAWYERS
[I]t must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious
and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State
acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe
that this same Constitution stands as a barrier.
Thurgood Marshall
294
Proportional representation of Blacks in the legal profession will never
occur if the existing incomplete logic of the "reverse discrimination" argument
prevails. Even with the recent impact of affirmative action programs, a
regression analysis has been used to project when proportional representation
would occur. First, it is acknowledged that the first attack on this article's
example will be that it is merely dealing with numbers and quotas. However,
categories and representation cannot be ignored. It is reinterated that this
exercise is a graphic example of the potential result of the incomplete logic that
"two wrongs do not make a right." Second, it is acknowledged that the most
appropriate method of statistical analysis would be comparing the pre- civil
rights data (pre-1964 data) with the recent post-civil rights data. However, this
was impossible because the data necessary for analysis was not kept on Blacks
pre-1964.295
Both conservatives and liberals want well-qualified people in the legal
profession. How to get there is the key question. Is it "sooner" (potentially the
year 2021 with the impact of recent programs) or "later?" Who knows
when?296 Should immediate scrutiny and questioning be suffered or should
time be taken in the hope of arriving at what is acceptable on both sides?
294 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, T.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
295 Personal communication with Rick Morgan, Data Specialist, American Bar Association
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (May, 1996).
296 The question often arises; how long will it take to bring about equality/equilibrium for
Afro-Americans? One approach is slavery has existed in this country since 1691, (see Before
the Mayflower: A History of Black America, Larone Bennett. Johnson Publishing Co. (1980))
which means that slavery and its derivative effects have been with us for almost 400 years.
Therefore, it could take at least another 400 years. Another approach was possibly,
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Perhaps later may disadvantage and disenfranchise larger numbers than
what is initially obvious. Sooner will ultimately disadvantage and
disenfranchise less people. Whereas the conservative approach would further
disadvantage the disadvantaged group, the ultimate impact would be greater.
Thus, this line of reasoning is more likely to perpetuate the statistical
inequality.
The real question, however, of the "later" route is whether equality can ever
be achieved. This statistical analysis shows it cannot, sans affirmative action.
False reassurance leads to wrong information that perpetuates a laissez-faire
attitude by some and a strong opposition by others. This result will have a
negative impact on the greatest number of people. Perpetuating the belief that
equality can be achieved without compromise to someone or a group is wrong.
This wrong information will ultimately produce a cultural and economic impact
that compromises society as a whole. To assume Blacks will ever be
proportionately represented without affirmative action is mathematically and
logically incorrect.
Affirmative action aids Blacks in gaining proportional representation;
however, many Whites, and some Blacks,297 see affirmative action as reverse
discrimination. The idea of reverse discrimination has spurred on intense
debate by all races. The theory of reverse discrimination has had the effect of
limiting the remedies and opportunities that were encouraging minorities.
X. REVERSE DISCRIMINATION: INCOMPLETE LOGIC AND INCONSISTENT
LEGAL REASONING
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program
in a racially neutral way and have it successful. In order to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to
treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we
dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.
Harry A. Blackmun
298
inadvertently referred to in Gratz in which Justice O'Connor used the figure of twenty-five
years. The question remains, how long it will take, to whom, and who makes the determination.
297 Ward Connerly, Armstrong Williams, and Alan Keyes, all who are well-known Black
conservatives against affirmative action.
298 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, H.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Reverse discrimination - Prejudice or bias exercised against a person or
class for purpose of correcting a pattern of discrimination against another
person or class.29
The term "reverse discrimination" has recently received notoriety sufficient
to support its inclusion in Blacks Law Dictionary. 3°° Although the concept of
reverse discrimination is not the focal point of this article, it must be considered
in analyzing the incomplete logic and inconsistent legal reasoning applied when
dealing with the concept. Reverse discrimination, however, is worthy of a
separate paper.
Sociologist Nathan Glazer is known for his views on the effect of
affirmative action policies on Whites. 30 1  In his book, Affirmative
Discrimination,302 Glazer highlights his view that with race-based hiring
policies in place, discrimination against Whites occurs. "...[t]he point of setting
a [racial hiring] goal is that one will hire more of one group, less of another,
simply because individuals are members of one group or another. "3 03 Glazer
stresses that discrimination is still occurring instead of adopting the original
intention for affirmative action, which promoted a policy of equality of
opportunity, including programs to recruit or train Blacks who could later
compete in a fair competition for jobs. °4 Opposition to affirmative action has
changed form over the years as reflected by various "negative packages,
305
identified in the media. Titles included: No Preferential Treatment (asserting
"the consideration of race or ethnicity, however benignly motivated, is not the
American way"),3° Undeserving Advantage (asserting "[a]ffirmative action
gives minorities something that they have not earned and do not deserve"),
307
and Blacks Hurt (asserting "racial preferences reinforce stereotypes that
minorities cannot do it alone, thus stigmatizing them"). 30 8 However, it is
interesting to note that Glazer has changed his viewpoint on affirmative action.
He states that the institution of programs to compensate Blacks in America and
299 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (6th ed. 1990).
300 Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 569.
301 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (6th ed. 1990).
302 Id. (citing Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
303 SKRENTNY, supra note 14, at 21.
304 NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION, ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC
PoLicy, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975 (1987)).
305 SKRENTNY, supra note 14, at 21.3
06 Id.
37 Id. at 22.
308 Id. at 22.
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the increased focus on multi-culturalism in society resulted from the
unwillingness of America to incorporate Blacks into society.309 The anger and
frustration Blacks felt as a result spurred on multi-culturalism and affirmative
action, according to Glazer.310
While some Whites have fanned the flames to the reverse discrimination
theory, a true reverse discrimination practice has been surfaced in recent years.
This practice is the use of legacy programs in secondary schools and colleges to
grant admission to these schools to descendents of alumni.
XI. LEGACY: TRUE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
"in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Earl Warren
311
Discrimination - In constitutional law, the effect of a statute or established
practice which confers particular privileges on a class arbitrarily selected
from a large number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the
privileges granted and between whom and those not favored no reasonable
distinction can be found.312
Legacy programs, by granting preference to those who have not been
wronged, are truly a form of "reverse discrimination." Legacy programs grant
preference in college admission programs to children and grandchildren of
school alumni. This affirmative action by granting preference in college
admissions is a common practice today, especially at Ivy League schools.
Legacy preference was first used in the 1920s when increasing numbers of
Jewish students were outscoring White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) on
the Ivy League entrance exams.3 13 Today legacy policies remain widespread.
For example, children of Harvard alumni typically make up 12 % of Harvard's
freshman class, and University of California, Berkeley, gives preference to




311 Brown v. Bd. of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
312 Black's Law Dictionary 457 (6th ed. 1990) quoting Baker v. California Land Title Co.,
349 F.Supp. 235, 238-39 (1972).
313 Connie Leslie, et al., A Rich Legacy of Preference, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1991, at 59
(quoting John Larew, Washington Monthly, June, 1991).
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legacies by admitting and billing them as in-state students.314 For over 50
years, elite universities have practiced granting legacies preference. In fact,
officials at the University of California, Davis, acknowledge that Alan Bakke
would have been admitted without appeal to the Supreme Court if at least five
less qualified White applicants had not been accepted ahead of him because of
"family clout."315 Similarly, a review of subpoenaed records showed the
parents of 270 of 349 applicants accepted at the University of Chicago medical
school from 1970 through 1974 contributed almost $11 million. This averages
approximately $40,000 per student.
316
When a federal study emerged from complaints by Asian-Americans that
some colleges were discriminating against them in favor of less-qualified White
students, the U.S. Department of Education reviewed Harvard's undergraduate
admissions for the classes of 1983 through 1992.317 It concluded that the
practice by Harvard of routinely granting preferential admission to children of
alumni was not discriminatory. This report noted that the combined SAT
scores of legacies who were admitted were 35 points lower than other students.
While only 16.9 % of Harvard applicants were admitted, 35.7 % of children of
Harvard alumni were admitted. Additionally, Yale, Dartmouth, and Stanford
have admitted giving preference to the children of alumni.3 18 The report
attempted to justify the court's reasoning by saying that, "although records
indicated that Asian Americans were admitted at a lower rate than White
applicants, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) could find no evidence of a quota
limiting their presence at Harvard" [emphasis added]. 3 19 The evidence revealed
that Asian Americans have gone from being 5.5 % of the class in 1983 to being
19.6 % of the class of 1994.320 Quoting Michael L. Williams, Assistant
Secretary for Civil Rights, (known for his strong opposition to affirmative
action) "while these preferences have an adverse effect on Asian Americans,
we determined that they were long-standing and legitimate, and not a pretext
for discrimination." [Emphasis added]321 Harvard acknowledged there were
314 id.
315 THE WASH. POST, Jul. 6, 1978, at DC9.
316 Id. A federal audit revealed that 25 of those admitted after their parents made sizable
donations later received federal loans and scholarships on the grounds they were "needy
students." Id.
317 U.S. DEPT. EDUC. REP., Harvard Cleared of Asian-American Discrimination Charges,
Washington, Oct. 5, 1990.
3181id.
319 Id. at 1.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 2.
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three major categories of applicants for whom preferences or "tips" are given:
1) racial/ethnic minority groups, 2) recruited athletes, and 3) children of alumni
(legacies). 2  Harvard had no separate instructions describing how the
preference was applied to legacies. However, all legacy applicants were
routinely referred to the Dean of Admissions for reading.323 The Office of Civil
Rights found a "great deal of evidence suggesting that the preferences or 'tips'
given to children of alumni and recruited athletes were significant factors in the
admissions process. 024 However, the OCR found "little or no evidence of an
ethnic tip being given to Asian American applicants. 3 25 Notwithstanding, the
decision to fail to give a tip to Asian American applicants was found to be "a
matter of institutional policy [emphasis added], 326 and the failure not to do so
did not constitute a violation of Title VI. 327 Finally, the report noted:
OCR reviewed current case law and found no legal authority to suggest that
giving preferences to legacies and recruited athletes was legally
impermissible. In fact, the case law suggests that if schools are to possess a
desirable diversity, officials must retain wide discretion, with respect to the
manner of selecting students. The courts have generally been reluctant, if not
unwilling to dictate what considerations or methods of selection are to be
given priority in college admissions. OCR finds that the reasons or goals
provided by Harvard for giving preferences to children of alumni and
recruited athletes are legitimate institutional goals, and not a pretext for
discrimination against Asian Americans. [Emphasis added]
3 28
Thus, the same incomplete logic used to deny affirmative action to remedy
centuries of oppression is now used to invoke the privilege of "desirable
diversity" and "wide discretion" for those who have not been wronged. That is
reverse discrimination.
Carl Monk, Executive Director of the Association of American Law
Schools, released a memo following Hopwood on March 21, 1996, warning
that "the decision of the 5th Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas, if applied nationally,
will seriously undermine the ability of law schools in the United States to
provide for a legal profession that meets the needs of all Americans in a global
322 Id. at 7.
323 id.




328 Id. at 9.
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economy and changing world. 3 29  He noted that the Hopwood opinion
"trivializes the benefits of racial and ethnic diversity, and ignores the effects of
past racial discrimination by not only the State of Texas, but also the University
of Texas School of Law." 330 While finding any consideration of an applicant's
race unconstitutional, the decision "specifically authorizes" the law school to
consider "relationship to school alumni" in making admissions decisions.
33'
Today, preferential treatment can be given to the children or grandchildren
of alumni who attended a law school that was ordered to abandon official
dejure race discrimination only 50 years ago. This approach would directly
foster the continuation of past racial discrimination. Furthermore, the Court's
suggestion that legitimate educational diversity is no more enhanced by
considering race than by considering height or blood type totally ignores the
role that race plays in our society.332 "The law has made him equal, but man
has not., 333 Therefore, legacy programs by granting preference to those who
have not been wronged are indeed reverse discrimination. Why is the "wrong"
of giving preference to legacies acceptable here, and not in the advancement of
the Black minority?
While granting preference to legacies and minorities (in the form of
affirmative action) has been argued as "wrong," it in essence could be having a
detrimental effect on the educational opportunities of Whites, or so some
scholars argue. The reality of the situation is that universities, by diversifying
their incoming classes, have begun offering courses that focus on histories and
cultures of minority groups. Some argue that this is a threat to educational
opportunities, but that would seem to be an oxy-moron; university offerings of
other cultures is a form of education, and is no different than studying the
history or culture of countries, societies, or religious groups outside of the
United States.
329 Memoranda, Association of American Law Schools, comments of Carl C. Monk,
Executive Director, regarding the decision in Hopwood v. State of Texas , March 21, 1996,
Washington D.C., p. 1.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. The memo advises, "The Association of American Law Schools will take whatever
action is reasonable and necessary to try to assure that this decision is, in the short term, limited
to the 5th Circuit and in the long term, reversed. We must not stand idly by and permit the
resegregation of legal and higher education. Although there has been great progress in recent
decades, legal education still has a long road to travel to produce a truly diverse profession
prepared to meet the needs of American society." Id.
333 Id.
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XII. EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES OF NON-MINORITIES THREATENED:
INCOMPLETE LOGIC AND INCONSISTENT LEGAL REASONING
"... the logic of words should yield to the logic of realities."
Louis D. Brandeis
334
"Logic-the science of reasoning, or of the operations of the understanding
which subservient to the estimation of evidence. The term includes both the
process itself of proceeding from known truths to unknown, and all other
intellectual operations, in so far as auxiliary to this.
335
Additionally, educational opportunities of non-minorities have also been
threatened by the incomplete logic that opposes affirmative action. In his book,
Illiberal Education, Dinesh D'Souza, a known antagonist to affirmative action,
points out that the word "liberal" is a derivative of the word "liberalis," which
refers to a free person as opposed to slave. 336 D'Souza, however, criticizes that
most universities have changed their admissions policies so they can admit a
portion of each freshman class with minority groups, 'mainly Blacks and
Hispanics' who have "considerably lower grade point averages and
standardized test scores than [W]hite and Asian American applicants who are
refused admission. '3 37 Questioning the effectiveness of affirmative action
policies he states, "[t]he coveted perks of so-called affirmative action policies
have sometimes been extended to other groups claiming deprivation and
discrimination, such as American Indians, natives of Third World countries,
women, Vietnam veterans, the physically disabled (now sometimes called the
"differently abled"), homosexuals, and lesbians." 338 While he admits that it is
334 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
335 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990).33 6 
DINESH D' SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE PoLmCs OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPus 23
(1991).
337 Id. at 2.
338 Id. at 3. D'Souza's examples include:
(1) "At Ivy League colleges ... incoming freshmen have average grade scores close to 4.0
and average SATs of 1,250 to 1,300. According to admissions officials, however, several of
these schools admit black, Hispanic, and American Indian students with grade averages as low
as 2.5 and SAT aggregates, 'in the 700 to 800 range."'
... "This information was provided by official who requested anonymity, and verified by
alumni and members of judiciary committees with access to admissions data. While most
admissions officers will privately admit its accuracy, they will not publicly release this sort of
information 'because we don't think it's anybody's business,' in the words of a source at the
Princeton admissions office."' Id. at 258, n. 2.
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often difficult for minorities admitted on the basis of preferential treatment to
compete, he criticizes the programs and incentives to encourage these students
to pass their courses and stay in school. He argues, "it is in liberal education,
properly devised and understood, that minorities and indeed all students will
find the means for their true permanent emancipation.''39  However, he
criticizes universities admissions policies that have changed their admissions
policies to increase admissions from minority groups.34° Furthermore, he states,
"[m]ost American universities have diluted or displaced their 'core
curriculum"' in the great works of Western civilization to make room for new
course requirements stressing non-Western cultures, Afro-American Studies,
and Women's Studies. ' 341 D'Souza reasons that sensitive race and gender
issues result in the university leadership discouraging faculty from presenting
factual material that may provoke or irritate minority students.342 This adds to
the resulting illiberal education.
(2) Similar patterns can be found at state schools. "Over ... five years, the University of
Virginia has virtually doubled its Black enrollment by accepting more than 50 percent of Blacks
who apply, and fewer than 25 percent of Whites, even though White students generally have
much better academic credentials. In 1988 the average White freshman at the university scored
240 points higher on the SAT than the average Black freshman. An admissions dean to the
Washington Post, 'We take in more from the groups with weaker credentials and make it harder
for those with stronger credentials."' Id. (quoting Lawrence Feinberg, Black Freshman
Enrollment Rises 40 Percent at U-Va, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1988, at C-i). Additionally,
D'Souza reported that, for 1988 the SAT average for Blacks was 1,004 out of a possible 1,600;
for Whites it was 1,244. For 1989 the Black average was 1023; for Whites it was 1,251.
Figures supplied by the University of Virginia admissions office. Id. at 258 n. 3.
(3) "Pennsylvania State University ... offers financial incentives to Blacks to maintain
minimum grades and graduate. Black students who maintain a grade average of C to C+ during
a year get checks from the school for $580; for higher grade averages the get $1,160." This
applies for all four years of college and is not available for other minority or White students.
Id. at 3-4.
(4)Starting in fall of 1990, Florida Atlantic University offered free tuition to every Black
student who was admitted as a part of a program to increase Black enrollment. The President,
Anthony Catanese, identified the measure as necessary to demonstrate the University is "serious
about recruiting" Blacks. Id. at 4 (quoting Laura Parker, Florida School to Offer Free Tuition
to Blacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1990, at A-7).
(5) "In 1989 the Columbia Law Review announced a recruitment program offering
preferential treatment for homosexuals and lesbians. The journal added five seats to its editorial
board to promote "diversity," including special consideration for 'sexual orientation."' Id. at 5
(quoting Stephen Labaton, Law Review Is Entangled in Debate on Bias Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1989.
319 Id. at 3.
340 Id. at 2-3.
34 Id. at 5.342 lad.
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D'Souza's argument is a perfect example of incomplete logic in three areas.
First, the students in his examples were not on equal ground from the narrow
perspective of what is necessary to succeed in a university that favors White,
Anglo-Saxon teaching/learning methods. Second, to deny them the
accommodations to put them on equal ground is not only unfair to the minority
students, it compromises the non-minority students by limiting their exposure to
minorities. Finally, D'Souza fails to attack other affirmative action programs
such as legacy programs.343
Having analyzed the situation of Black Americans by considering
mathematics, physics, statistics, philosophy, history, and the law that author
now examines some other situations where a "first wrong" occurred and then a
second "wrong" or remedy was offered to rectify the first "wrong." These
situations have occurred in various areas of the law, as well as different periods
in history.
XII. Two WRONGS Do MAKE A RIGHT: OTHER LEGAL ANALOGIES
The remainder of this article discusses instances in the history of the United
States where two wrongs do make a right. In every example, a victim is
compensated for some wrong visited upon him by someone. This author is not
meaning to state that these programs or legislation are unnecessary and never
should have been instituted. Nor does this article call for the repeal of any of
these instances of compensation. Indeed, the fundamental tenants of all of
these programs are extremely important. However, affirmative action should be
afforded the same protections as say environmental protection, veterans' rights,
and antitrust legislation. Many veterans, like Blacks, were impressed
involuntarily, via conscription, into servitude of this country, and thus are
afforded preferences and services as compensation. Antitrust legislation seeks
to do away with unfair business practices. These are exactly the reasons
affirmative action was instituted. The fact that cries for the abolition of
affirmative action as a remedy for a long-gone problem over all of these other
instances, serve only to exemplify the very real state of racism in the United
States today. That is, two wrongs do make a right, but only for the right kinds
of people, with "real" wrongs inflicted upon them. This position indicates a
fundamental misunderstanding of race in society by the majority, and is simply
untenable.
343 Id. (although the author has chosen legacy as an example, the same analogy can be
made with athletic scholarships).
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While society is unwilling to remedy wrongs to African Americans, it has
been willing to rectify wrongs by the United States in other situations. The first
analogy that demonstrates two wrongs do make a right is the restitution made to
Japanese-Americans for internment during World War II.
A. Two Wrongs Do Make a Right: Restitution For World War H
Internment of Japanese-Americans
"Racial classifications drawn for the purpose of remedying the effects of
discrimination that itself was race based have a highly pertinent basis: the
tragic and indelible fact that discrimination against blacks and other racial




"Restitution - an equitable remedy under which a person is restored to his
or her original position prior to loss or injury, or placed in the position he or she
would have been, had the breach not occurred. ' '34
On December 8, 1941, the United States declared war on Japan.346 On
March 2, 1942, General J. L. DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1
pursuant to Executive Order 9066 stating "the entire Pacific Coast ...is subject to
espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requiring the adoption of military
measures necessary to establish safeguards against such enemy operations. 
3 47
Fred Korematsu, a native born United States citizen, was of Japanese
ancestry.34 It was uncontested that Mr. Korematsu was "loyal to the United
States and had no dual allegiance to Japan. '"349 However, on September 8, 1942,
he was convicted of being in a place where all persons of Japanese ancestry
were excluded pursuant to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 issued by General
DeWitt3 °  Mr. Korematsu's conviction was affirmed.35' In 1983, Mr.
3" City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
345 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
346 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
347 id.
348 id.
349 Id. Mr. Korematsu had never left the United States, was registered for the draft, and
"willing to bear arms" for the United States. Id.
350 Id.
351 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). However, even then Judge Jackson
argued unsuccessfully that this judicial opinion validated racial discrimination. "Once a judicial
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Korematsu petitioned for a writ of coram nobis352 to vacate his conviction
based on grounds of governmental misconduct. 353 He successfully argued that
"evidence was suppressed or destroyed in the proceedings that led to his
conviction and its affirmance." 354 His success was largely based on the findings
of The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.
355
The Commission found that the exclusion and detention of the Japanese was
not warranted by the military. The Commission concluded "broad historical
causes which shaped these decisions [exclusion and detention] were race
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. 3 56 As a result, "a
grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese
ancestry who, without individual review, or any probative evidence against
opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather
rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for
all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of
transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim or an urgent need." Id. at 246
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
352 The "Writ of error coram nobis" is a procedural tool to correct errors of fact only. Its
function is to "bring before the court rendering the judgment matters of fact which, if known at
time judgment was rendered, would have prevented its rendition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
337 (6th ed. 1990). Although Rule 60 (b) of Fed. R. Civ. P. abolishes some common law writs,
a writ of coram nobis is an appropriate remedy by which the court can correct errors in criminal
convictions where other remedies are not available. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1411 (quoting
United States v. Morgan 346 U. S. 502 (1954)). "[I]t is in these unusual circumstances that an
extraordinary writ such as the writ of coram nobis is appropriate to correct fundamental errors
and prevent injustice." Id. (quoting United States v. Correa-De Jesus, 708 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1983)).
353 Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1409.
354 Id. at 1410. "The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians was
established in 1980 by an act of Congress. It was directed to review the facts and circumstances
surrounding Executive Order 9066 and its impact on American citizens and permanent resident
aliens; to review directives of the United States military forces requiring the relocation and, in
some cases, detention in internment camps of American citizens, including those of Japanese
ancestry; and to recommend appropriate remedies." Id. at 1416 quoting Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-317, § 2. 94 Stat.
964 (1980). The Commission was made up of former members of Congress, Supreme Court,
and Cabinet in addition to private citizens. It held approximately twenty days of hearings in
various United States cities, and heard the testimony of over 720 witnesses. These witnesses
included "key government personnel responsible for decisions involved in the issuance of
Executive Order 9066, and the military orders implementing it." Id. Additionally, the
Commission reviewed numerous government documents, including some documents that were
not previously publicly available. Considering all the above factors, the Report was considered
trustworthy and worthy of judicial notice. Id.
311 Id. at 1416.
356 Id. at 1416, 1417.
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them, were excluded, removed, and detained by the United States during World
War 11.357 In this case, District Judge Patel noted "...the court is not powerless
to correct its own records where a fraud has been worked upon it or where
manifest injustice has been done." 358 Looking to define an appropriate remedy,
Judge Patel wrote "[t]he question before the court is not so much whether the
conviction should be vacated, as what is the appropriate ground for relief.
359
The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 was enacted on August 10, 1988 to
redress36° the wrongs committed by the United States government to Japanese
Americans during World War 11. This Act called for a formal apology written
by the President and $20,000361 in compensation to each survivor 362 of
America's concentration camps.363 The purpose of the Act's sections 1989 and
1989(d) included:
357 Id. at 1417 (quoting U.S. COMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVIIANS, U.S. DEPr. OF DEFENSE, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 18 (1982)).
358 Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1416.
359 id.
360 Redress is "a means or a possibility of seeking a remedy." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE
AMERICAN HISTORY: AN A-To-Z REFERENCE FROM 1868 TO THE PRESENT 289 (Brian Niiya ed.,
2d ed., Facts on File 2001) (1993). "It also means 'to set right' and 'to make up for.' 'Redress'
can also mean 'compensation for wrong or loss: reparation.' 'Reparations' refers to the act of
making amends, usually in the form of compensation. It is a specific form of redress." Id. at
342. The Japanese Americans sought a remedy to compensate them for their wrongful detention
in concentration camps during World War II. Id. The National Coalition for
Redress/Reparations (NCRR) was careful in including the distinction when it named its
organization. "Since 'redress' on its own could imply only a remedy or an apology, it was not
seen as sufficient to only campaign around that issue. 'Reparations,' on the other hand, left no
doubt that monetary compensation was to be demanded." Id. Eventually, however, redress and
reparations became synonymous, and the term 'Redress Movement' emerged. Id.
361 "There are authorized to be appropriated to the Fund $1,650,000,000..." Pub.L. No.
100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified as 50 U.S.C. Sec 1989b-3e).
362 It should be noted that the benefit of the doubt was legislated in an attempt to remedy
the wrongs to those who suffered. "When, after consideration of all evidence and relevant
material for determining whether an individual is an eligible individual, there is an approximate
balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the
determination of eligibility, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given
to such individual."
Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified as 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1989b-4 (a)(3)).
Additionally, the authors of this act chose to make the remedy inheritable to a surviving spouse,
if there was no surviving spouse then to the living children in equal shares, and if no surviving
spouse or living children existed, then to the living parents of the eligible individual. Pub. L.
No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified as 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1989b-4 (a)8 (A) (i-iii).363Id. at 119.
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1. Acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation,
and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry during World War H;
2. Apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent resident
aliens;
3. Provide for a public education fund to finance efforts to inform the
public about the internment of such individuals, so as to prevent the recurrence
of any similar event;
4. Make restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were
interned;
5. Make restitution to Aleut residents of the Pribilof Islands, and the
Aleutian Islands west of Unimak Island, in settlement of United States
obligations in equity and at law, for---
A. Injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships endured while those
Aleut residents were under United States control during World War H;
B. Personal property taken or destroyed by United States forces
during World War II;
C. Community property, including community church property, taken
or destroyed by United States forces during World War II; and
D. Traditional village lands on Attu Island not rehabilitated after
World War II for Aleut[ ]occupation or other productive use;
6. Discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil
liberties in the future; and
7. Make more credible and sincere any declaration of concern by the
United States over violation of human rights committed by other nations. 3
Not all supported the Act. Congresswoman Bentley, of Maryland, gave
impassioned comments regarding the views of her constituents.
Mr. Speaker, last night when I arrived home, my husband, who served in the
Army during the Korean war CAme. into the kitchen shaking his head and
. .J ... --- ...... .. 
.. --- ..............
muttering, "If you want a fast divorce, you vote for that outrageous
expenditure of our money." I was not sure what he was talking about. I
'64 Pub.L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified as 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1989).
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asked him. He responded that he had been watching C-SPAN and had heard
the floor debate concerning the reparations to those persons who had been
incarcerated during World War II. "That was wartime," he shouted, "and we
did not start the war. If anyone should get anything, it should be the
American prisoners who were treated cruelly and frequently tortured,
sometimes tortured to death. Mr. Speaker, my veteran husband, Bill Bentley,
like all the veterans in my district, oppose this legislation, as do I. 365
Congressman Lungren, California, agreed with Congresswoman Bentley,
calling restitution for the Japanese Internment survivors a wrong.
[W]hen I came to this Congress 10 years ago, one of the concerns that was
raised to me by some folks who worked with me plus some people in my
district was the question of the treatment of the Japanese Americans during
World War II. Having been someone who grew up in southern California, an
area which was dramatically changed as a result of the Executive order signed
by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but having been born after the war
and not knowing that much about it, I began to investigate it. Once I realized
what had occurred, I decided that I ought to be part of bringing this to the
attention of the American people. Therefore, I cosponsored the original
legislation to create the Commission and served as the only Member of this
House on that Commission.
I have fought against the idea of individual reparations. I still believe it is a
wrong thing to do. I do not think we expiate our guilt by paying money from
a subsequent generation... When I was on the Commission, I voted with all
the other Commissioners in favor of the overall report, although I dissented
with respect to the recommendations with respect to individual reparations.
366
Finally, on October 9, 1990, the first redress payment was made to the
oldest living survivors of America's concentration camps.367 A letter from
President George Bush accompanied the $20,000 check to attempt to
compensate for the grave injustices toward the Japanese Americans. The letter
stated:
A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase painful
memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation's resolve to rectify
365 CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 442, Civn. LIBERTIES Ac5 OF 1988. 100th Cong. 2nd
Sess. 134 Cong Rec. H 6307, Vol. 134 No. 115.
366 Id.
367Id. at 291.
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injustice and to uphold the rights of individuals. We can never fully right the
wrongs of the past. But we can take a clear stand for justice and recognize
that serious injustices were done to Japanese Americans during World War
II. In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering a sincere apology,
your fellow Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their traditional
commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice. You and your
family have our best wishes.368
It took 40 years, and two generations, for the full story of the camps to
emerge in the public arena. 369 United States officials were "reluctant to re-open
a dark chapter of our history, in which citizens were rounded up and shipped
away without due cause. 3 70  However, the government did choose to
acknowledge the wrong as is noted in Judge Patel's opinion. Where, as here,
the government offers no opposition and, in effect, joins in a similar request for
relief, an expansive inquiry is not necessary. 371 In fact, the government agrees
that the petitioner is entitled to relief and concedes: "There is, therefore, no
continuing reason in this setting for the court to convene hearings or make
findings about petitioner's allegations of governmental wrongdoing in the
1940's. 3 72 Judge Patel continues
[tihe government has, however, while not confessing error, taken a position
tantamount to confession of error.373 It has eagerly moved to dismiss without
acknowledging any specific reasons for dismissal other than that "there is no
further usefulness to be served by conviction under a statute which has been
soundly repudiated.374
In support of this statement, the government points out that in 1971,
legislation was adopted requiring congressional action before an Executive
Order, such as Executive Order 9066, can ever be issued again; then in 1976,
the statute under which petitioner was convicted was repealed; and that in
1976, all authority conferred by Executive Order 9066 was formally proclaimed
terminated as of December 31, 1946. While these are compelling reasons for
concluding that vacating the conviction is in the best interests of this petitioner,
368 Letter from President George Bush.
369 -- l... D .. . l ... -' 1 - -. .. • . .. l n rr _ "... . A . . --
-vlull, I fUya I tvtt I Fll L.' v J VT YTII " Y LYjjecL o JvFaLreP ffl l. I M
SEAT=rLE TImEs, Sept. 18, 1995, at F3.
370 id.
371 Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1413.
372 Id. (quoting Response at 3).
373 Id.
374 Id. (quoting R.T. 13:20-22, November 19, 1983).
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respondent, and the public, the court declines the invitation of the government
to treat this matter in the perfunctory and procedurally improper manner that it
has suggested.375
On the issue of an appropriate remedy, Judge Patel concludes,
"[fortunately, there are few instances in our judicial history when courts have
been called upon to undo such profound and publicly acknowledged injustice.
Such extraordinary instances require extraordinary relief, and the court is not
without power to redress its own errors.
3 76
Here, it is clear that the Court chose to correct the wrong that emerged from
racial prejudice by reversing a conviction. Additionally, the government chose
to publicly correct the wrong by monetary compensation, which in this analogy
would be a "second wrong." Of course, here it is not recognized or seen as a
wrong, but were this same type of remedy to be awarded to African-Americans;
it would evoke the cries of "two wrongs don't make a right!"
When compared to the wrongs that Blacks have suffered there are no major
distinctions. Decades of slavery can surely be compared to "internment,"
segregation to "exclusion," and lynches to "war hysteria." In fact, the
distinction is only that the wrong to Blacks has continued for centuries rather
than a brief period of years. This is not to minimize what happened to those
interned Japanese Americans.377 Why, then, did the court choose to apply a
remedy that arguably "wronged" the taxpayers to remedy something that no
longer exists. Why does the court claim "reverse discrimination" when striking
down affirmative action, while the government chooses to remedy the "grave
injustice" to the Japanese by monetary compensation and public apology?
There is no justification for the distinction. However, there is a plausible,
yet unacceptable explanation based in economics. To understand this
explanation, a brief review of the international economic climate prior to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, is in order.
In 1944, democracy in the United States was more that an abstract idea; it
was a principle Americans were dying to protect. Ironically, U.S. soldiers
fighting against Nazi racism and anti-Semitism, fought in a segregated
375 id.
376 id.
377 In this authors considered opinion, Blacks support the interned Japanese Americans as
well as their descendants in their quest for reparations.
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army.378/379 In the years after World War II, other countries increased their
attention toward the racial discrimination in the United States. 380 "At a time
when the U.S. hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image, the
international attention given to racial segregation was troublesome and
embarrassing for the U.S. This has been the focus of American foreign policy
at this point was to promote democracy and to 'contain' communism. 0 8 1 The
contradictions between American political ideology and actual practice created
foreign policy difficulties with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.382
United States government officials, realizing their ability to promote democracy
in the Third World countries was impaired by racial unrest at home, promoted
civil rights.383 Ultimately, this potential impairment would have grave political
and economic consequences if not remedied. 384 Thus, Dudziak argues, the
desegregation movement must be examined through economics "within the
context of the cultural and political period in which they occurred.,
385
The restitution made to Japanese-Americans was an incident that involved
wrongs similar to those wrongs against African Americans. However, there
have been other situations not based on a racial or ethnic classification where
two wrongs have made a right.
B. Two Wrongs Do Make a Right: Environmental Wrongs
"The State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 386
378 Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61, 68
(1988).
379 This author's family has an exemplary military tradition, albeit in the segregated army.
His grandfather fought during World War I, under the French Flag, because Blacks (coloreds)
were not allowed to fight under the American Flag. He earned two Croix de Guerre (the French
Medal of Honor), one individually, and one as a member of his unit which earned the until
Croix de Guerre. The author's father, rose to the rank of major through the segregated army.
Segregation and equal rights for African-Americans has been the Achilles heel for the U.S. since
its inception (note the 3 /5
th clause).
1 (i. a L O .
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 62-3.
384 Id.
... Id. at 64.
386 Georgia v. Tenn. Cooper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
577
BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL
"Interest - the most general term that can be employed to denote a right,
claim, title, or legal share in something. 387
Rachael Carson's book, Silent Spring, served as a wake-up call to America
that the environment was being endangered by the tendency of man to try to
reap as much as he could out of this environment without having to deal with
the consequences of his actions. 388 For the most part, Carson was right. Nearly
three centuries after the founding of this country, there could hardly be what
one might think of today as any serious environmental movement, except the
Native American movement. The most successful area of environmental
initiatives before the mid-twentieth century was undoubtedly the
preservationist-conservationist ethic of Teddy Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot, and
other silk-stocking mavericks. 38 9 Their movement, however, did not define or
address environmental threats broadly. National park legislation focused on
isolated niches of the American landscape, not on regulatory objectives.39 °
From that time to this, the environmental movement has built up quite a
body of law in a relatively short period of time. This phenomena intensified in
1978 with the Love Canal debacle. Love Canal, near Niagara Falls, was built
on top of an abandoned waste dump containing approximately 352 million
pounds of chemical waste, including dioxin, one of the most deadly substances
known to man. 39 1 Residents suffered increased cancer rates, genetic damage,
miscarriages, and chemical bums as a result of leachate and toxic fumes.39 2
The wake of Love Canal prompted Congress to enact Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in
1980. This portion of the article will focus on CERCLA due to the expansive
nature of its effect on the environment. The Act created a "Superfund" to be
used to clean up hazardous sites.393 CERCLA's policy, since enactment in
1980, essentially takes the burden of paying for environmental problems of the
ordinary citizen. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can order those
who are responsible for the pollution to pay for the clean-up. Furthermore, the
387 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 812 (6th ed. 1990).
388 
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
389 Zygmunt, J.B. Plater, From the beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A
Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 981 (1994).
390 Id.
391 H.R.REP. NO. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6121.
392 Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 396 n. 13
(1991).
'9342 U.S.C. § 9611 (1980).
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EPA can order any potentially responsible party (PRP) to clean up a site.394
Failure of a PRP to comply with such an order, without sufficient cause, results
in a fine of up to $25,000 per day.395 Since CERCLA liability is interpreted as
joint and several,396 an individual PRP who contributed a small portion of the
hazardous substances at a site can be in a position of either cleaning up the
entire site, or facing massive fines.
397
Thus, it seems that Congress and the states are more than willing to ensure
that those who pollute pay the costs of clean-up. This is also the goal of
affirmative action in a sense. That is, those who have reaped the rewards of
"polluting" behavior and attitudes should have to pay to compensate those who
have been damaged for the clean-up of the landscape of American society.
This was not a revolutionary concept in the 1990s and yet, environmental
legislation was touted while affirmative action was castigated.
Certainly, there are those on the anti-affirmative action side who state that
those who did the "polluting" of American Blacks are gone. In other words, no
presently living being either brought Blacks to America, or set up the caste
system in this country. However, the descendents of those who instigated this
system still continue to benefit from the legacy of discrimination. If someone
must "pay" in some form, be it lost job opportunities or scholarships, this
"payment" is necessary to balance to racial system under which they have they
have prospered for many years. This is obviously a more teleological/utilitarian
argument. Society would not allow those who pollute the environment to state
that they have quit polluting, and, thus should not be responsible for the mess
their company made, even if run by their father, grandfather, or other
predecessor.398
'94 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
'95 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
396 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (applying federal
common law to impose joint and severally liability under CERCLA unless the defendant can
establish a reasonable basis for allocating the harm).
397 See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding a company jointly and
severally liable for 20% of the cleanup cost although it supplied only 10 barrels of toxic waste at
a site where over 10,000 barrels were found), cert. denied, 493 U.S. i07i (i090).
398 Another example could be that military bases, that have had air fuel, are currently
required to clean-up carcinogenic substances from the fuels and other contaminants having to do
with airplanes, even though the military has taken great steps to cease pollution. Currently they
are not only very aware, but are very active participants in environmental clean-up methods. In
essence, derivative or inherited defects are being remedied again today, even though those
responsible are no longer here to contribute. With regard to the acts of the past, the current
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Why then, do two wrongs make a right with regard to the environment, and
not with race-based discrimination? The answer is that two wrongs do make a
right in both cases. Thus, the logic utilized by those who call for the end of
affirmative action, while believing that environmental legislation is appropriate,
is misguided at best and duplicitous at worst. Society is willing to grant the
environment special consideration, but not African-Americans, even though
African Americans have most likely suffered more intense and longer
"wrongs." In another situation, the United States is willing to grant special
consideration to those who served their country in the armed forces. Why is it
that priority and preference granted to veterans is acceptable or "right," while
preference to minorities is unfair and unjust?
C. Two Wrongs Do Make a Right: Veterans
"No one has been barred on account of his racefromfighting or dying for




"Prefer - to give advantage, priority, or privilege.
' "
The Veterans' Preference Act of 194440' grants preference in a variety of
matters concerning federal employment to individuals, and their survivors, if
those individuals are honorably discharged from active duty in the United
States Armed Services.4°2 This Act, a codification of prior preference policies,
extends a favored status to more than 50% of the federal work force.4 °3
Through benefits codified in various sections of Title 5 of the United States
Code, "preference eligible" persons are offered increased opportunities for
appointment to Federal service and reduced risks of removal; all at the
"expense" of non-veteran workers. 4°4 Some feel this legislation "though
people could easily say that it is not of their doing, but of those that preceded us. Doesn't this
sound familiar in terms of remedial/affirmative action programs?
399 John F. Kennedy, special Message to Congress on Civil Rights, June 19, 1963, in
PUBLIC PAPERS OFTHE PRESIDENTS: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963, at 485 (1964).
4w BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (6th ed. 1990).
41 Act of June 27, 1944, ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
402 Stewart S. Manela, Veterans' Preference in Public Employment: The History,
Constitutionality, and Effect on Federal Personnel Practices of Veterans' Preference
Legislation, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 623 (1976).
403 Id. at 623 (quoting, Fact Sheet distributed by Veterans' Affairs Division, Bureau of
Recruitment and Examining, U.S. Civil Service Commission (1975)).
44id.
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constitutionally sound, unnecessarily burdens the efficient administration of
government and unduly restricts the employment opportunities of non-
veterans."405 This "expense," or wrong to non-veteran workers, is justified in
policy statements such as the Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952,
which states:
The Congress of the United States hereby declares that the veteran's
educational and training program created by this Act is for the purpose of
providing vocational readjustment and restoring lost educational
opportunities to those service men and women whose educational or
vocational ambitions have been interrupted or impeded by reason of active
service in the Armed Forces during a period of national emergency and for
the purpose of aiding such persons in attaining the educational and training
status which they might normally have aspired to and obtained had they not
served their country; and that the home, farm, and business-loan benefits, the
unemployment compensation benefits, the mustering out payments, and the
employment assistance provided for by this Act are for the purpose of
assisting in the readjustment of such persons from military to civilian life.
(Emphasis added)4°6
The federal government has offered special advantages to veterans since
the Civil War.40 7 However, attitudes have varied toward the propriety of
exempting veterans from employment requirements. For example, in 1881,
veterans were required to achieve examination scores equal to the scores of
non-veterans before a preference was granted.40 8 Are they qualified? Does not
this sound familiar? However, in 1910, the Attorney General reversed itself,
announcing that "preference points should be added irrespective of the
veteran's performance on required competitive examinations. "'4 9 The policy
was reversed again by an executive order thirteen years later.410 By the time of
405 Id. at 624.
406 The Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, 82 Pub. L. 550 (1952).
407 Manela, supra note 402. "In 1865, Congress passed a joint resolution giving disabled
veterans who possessed the capacity to handle government business a preference in appointment
to civil offices." Id. (quoting Resolution of Mar. 3, 1865, No. 27, 13 Stat. 571).
408 Id. (quoting 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 194 (1881)).
Id. (quoting 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 298 (1910)). This opinion stated veterans did not have to
pass the competitive examination to have their scores augmented. If the bonuses gave veterans
passing scores, the appointing authorities were required to place the veterans at the top of the
eligibles register.
410 Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 3,801 (Mar. 3, 1923)). The order withdrew from all
veterans their right to absolute preference, and limited the preference to the award of bonus
points.
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the Pendleton Act,41" preference was granted in appointment and retention
"only to those veterans who had qualifications superior or equal to the non-
veterans with whom they were competing; the policy did not permit preferential
advancement of veterans of lesser qualification. 
412
To qualify to receive examination and other appointment preferences
granted by the Act of 1944, eligibility was assessed. The Act required that five
points be added to the test score of any veteran achieving a passing grade.41 3
An applicant with permanent service-related disabilities received an additional
five points,414 and if the disability was rated at 10 %, his name was placed at the
top of the list of applicants for the job.4 15 This 10-point advantage extended to
unmarried widows or mothers of deceased veterans; "and to wives or mothers
of veterans disqualified for appointment by their disabilities.'A
6
In addition to bonus points for examinations, the Act gave preference
eligible individuals an exclusive right to compete for certain positions,
including guards, elevator operators, messengers, and custodians. Additionally,
if the position required previous experience, an eligible veteran was credited for
the total time in military service if his vocation, before entering the service, was
similar to that being sought. Finally, if age, height, or weight qualification
were prerequisites for the job, the 1944 Act waived the requirements unless the
requirements were essential to performance of the position's duties. Finally,
physical requirements were waived for any veteran whose medical evidence
established that he could do the job.
Veterans were given preference due to the nature of their service to the
United States, yet Blacks, who served involuntarily as workers, are not afforded
that same type of consideration. In yet another area of law, antitrust law,
victims are given the opportunity to seek injunctions and treble damages. Why
then are Blacks not afforded even the opportunity to be put on equal ground as
the rest of society?
411 The Pendleton Act was proposed to eliminate the "spoils system" of staffing the
Government. It substituted a system grounded on the principle that individual merit, as
measured by the capacity to perform a specified job, should determine eligibility for government
employment. Id. at fn. 17.
412 Id. (quoting Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, § 3, 19 Stat. 169; Resolution of Mar. 3
1865, No. 27, 13 Stat. 571.
413 Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3309 (2) (1970)).
414 Id. at 626 (quoting § 3309 (1)).
41s Id. at 626 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3313 (2) (A) (1970)).
416 Id. at 626 (quoting §§ 218, 3309 (1), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974)).
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D. Two Wrongs Do Make a Right: Antitrust
"Free competition is worth more to society than it costs."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.




Monopoly - a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more
persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a
particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale
of the whole supply of a particular commodity. A form of market structure in
which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or
service.419
The advent of the Industrial Revolution and the completion of the
transcontinental railroad in the United States were harbingers of a growing
place of prominence for American industry in the late 1800s.42° Many of the
major industrial forces of the latter 19th century sought to comer various
markets through unscrupulous, or at least anti-competitive, business practices,
and drive up prices as the burgeoning economy increased in size. In an attempt
to stem these activities, Congress passed the watershed legislation known as the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.4 2' There exists heated debate regarding the true
intentions of the legislators in passing the Sherman Act. There are those who
hold the opinion that Congressional intent rested on allocating efficiency within
modem economic theory; still, others argue that the Sherman Act was
promulgated as a direct result of political pressure from small business owners
who, being trampled by big business, saw the need for fairness to be introduced
into the economy.
The enforcement of the Sherman Act was lessened by the narrow
interpretation given to it by the courts. For example, in the landmark case of
Id.at 626 (quoting §§ 218, 3309(1), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974)).
418 Vegelahn v.Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896). (Holmes, 0., dissenting.)
419 Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to New York Legislature, 3 Jan. 1900, in WORKS
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 17:34, 54 (Hagedorn ed., Hermann 1925).
420 An over looked minority were the Chinese who had been Shanghaied for work on the
railroads.
421 15 U.S.C.A. § I et seq. (1890).
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United States v. E. C. Knight Co. ,422 the Supreme Court stated that the Sherman
Act did not apply to sugar producers because they, as manufacturers, fell
outside the scope of interstate commerce.42 3 The fundamental operation of
antitrust analysis shifted with the opinion of the court in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,42 4 in which Judge Taft, using controversial
reasoning, delineated the difference between per se anti-competitive practices,
which necessitated the imposition of damages, and those that were "ancillary"
to the creation of joint ventures, deemed to be permissible. 425
Dr. David R. Henderson426 wrote of the "wrongs" antitrust laws and the
Sherman Antitrust Act impose on the American economy.
Economists and others argue that antitrust laws are necessary because
companies might otherwise collude to keep prices high or merge with
potential rivals to reduce competition. But study the past effects of antitrust
enforcement, and you get a very different picture: It often hurts competition
or prevents mergers that would reduce costs and prices.
One antitrust advocate at the time, Rep. William Mason, admitted that 'trusts
have made products cheaper' but argued that the trusts 'have destroyed
legitimate competition and driven honest men from legitimate business
enterprises' (Translation: the competitors couldn't cut it). Sen. John Sherman,
after whom the antitrust law was named, was also a proponent of tariffs,
another measure that reduces competition, keeps prices high, and gives
inefficient companies a break.427
Henderson then continues to give an example of one of the most
devastating "wrongs" to ever be considered a right:
The scariest lesson from history is what antitrust can do to the stock market.
George Bittlingmayer of the University of California at Davis notes that many
major market declines were preceded by announcements of stepped-up
antitrust enforcement. On Friday, Oct. 25, 1929, to take the most notorious
422 156 U.S. 1, 15 (1895).
423 Id. at 15.
424 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
425 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST Poucy: THE LAw OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE, § 2.1b, at 53-4 (1994).
426 David R. Henderson, Ph.D. Economics from the University of California at Los Angeles
in 1976, is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, an Associate Professor at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
427 David R. Henderson, The Case Against Antitrust, FORTUNE. Apr. 1998, at 40-41.
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example, the Justice Department declared it would deal 'vigorously with
every violation of the antitrust law.' By the closing bell on Oct. 29, 1929, the
Dow had fallen 23%.428
Furthermore, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act were
passed in 1914 as a response to the "rule of reason" developed by the Court in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States and United States v. American Tobacco
Co.,
4 29 which many lawmakers felt would derogate the Sherman Act. The
Clayton Act directly denounced exclusive dealing arrangements and anti-
competitive price fixing, provided for expanded enforcement through greater
damage provisions, and criticized mergers much more strongly than the
Sherman Act.430 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act went even farther
than the Clayton Act in expanding the power of the government regarding anti-
competitive practices of private business.43' The FTC Act created the Federal
Trade Commission, an agency that could investigate, and take enforcement
action against businesses that engaged in anti-competitive behavior that did not
encroach on any of the previous anti-competitive legislation.432 Whatever were
the true intentions of Congress, and despite the initial interpretations of the
Court, the effect of the triad of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and the Federal
Trade Commission Act has been to give victims the right to seek an injunction,
or treble damages, to remedy the anti-competitive practices visited upon them
by violators of these laws.
Although there has been a shift in the application of anti-trust laws from
social and political concern, to reflecting the increasing importance given to
economic efficiency theories, the remedies provided by the laws themselves
continue to be an important factor in the operation of fairness in American
business. The provision for treble damages provided for in § 7 of the Clayton
Act has received the most attention. Many have wondered why damages
awarded should be three times their actual impact. The answer lies is several
foundations, primarily that of punishment and deterrence.433 From the time of
the English Statute of Monopolies in 1623, legal scholars have held that single
42
8 id.
429 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
... 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq.
131 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq.
432 id.
433 HOVENKAMP, supra note 425, § 17.3 at 599.
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damages would still make what are now referred to as antitrust violations
profitable since not all such incidents are detected.4 4
Why then is it that the goals of anti-trust legislation and affirmative action
are viewed as disparate? The two have exactly the same purpose: to
compensate those who are victims of continuing discrimination. To be sure,
there are those in the majority group that will suffer as a result of affirmative
action. That was demonstrated in the mathematical formula expressed supra. It
is this very fact that inspires many to call for the death of affirmative action.
However, under anti-trust legislation, there likewise are those in the majority
groups who fail to benefit as they had in the past. However, there has been no
groundswell of support for the repeal of antitrust legislation as there has been
recently for the repeal of affirmative action.
Affirmative action has been threatened and opposed practically since its
inception, yet in areas such as employment law, it would seem only natural that
there be no type of racial discrimination.
E. Two Wrongs Do Make a Right: Employment Law
You know, I am disturbed by what seems to becoming habit in this country,
to adopt certain theories that Marx advanced. One is that there is inevitable a
bitter and implacable warfare against the man that works, between the man
that works and the man who (sic) hires him. To my mind this is absolutely
and completely Un-American. It is not the way a free country must work.
Every last workman, down to the lowliest, the most menial task you can think




"Slave - A person who is wholly subject to the will of another; one who
has no freedom of action, but whose person and services are wholly under the
control of another. One who is under the power of a master, and who belongs
to him; so that the master may sell and dispose of his person, of his industry,
and of his labor,. .. The 13
0' Amendment abolished slavery.,
436
434 Id.
435 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Fourteenth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1959.
436 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1388 (6th ed. 1990).
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Forced labor, including slavery, was in existence when the nation was
founded. The pre-Civil War period was characterized by public tolerance of
forced labor, particularly for slaves, apprentices, indentured servants, orphans,
and debtors to labor. The law recognized a variety of direct and indirect
methods to enforce labor. The existence of forcible labor statutes created a
legal tolerance of subservience rather than equality of arms-length negotiators
as the principal paradigm of the relationship between an employer and an
employee.437
Racial Discrimination in Employment
The American experience of slavery was one that involved the forcible
capture of Africans for involuntary transport to the United States. African
slavery was then a heritable condition, so the children of slaves were then
destined also to be slaves of the master. The antebellum law of slavery was
primarily state law, therefore it varied from state to state. However, there was
federal involvement in the constitutional provision allowing for interstate
extradition of slaves, and the slave trade was fostered by the federal
government at one time. In Dred Scott v. Sanford,438 the Supreme Court held
that Dred Scott, his wife, and their two daughters were still the property of their
former master although they had been taken from a slave state into a free
state.439 The Court held that Dred Scott and his family were not "citizens"
under the Constitution, nor entitled to sue in the courts of the United States.
440
Therefore, the courts had no jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, Congress
could not pass any law depriving a slave owner of his property in a slave.
At the close of the Civil War, Congress finally took steps to ban slavery
constitutionally. The Thirteenth Amendment failed to pass on its first attempt
in the House. It finally passed the House by narrow margins in January of
1865. The Reconstruction Congress, motivated by the feeling that a single
constitutional amendment was not enough, passed two additional amendments
to the Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment is aimed at guaranteeing equality of rights, and the
Fifteenth Amendment at granting male freedmen the right to vote.
44 1
437 MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 4, 5 (West Publishing Co. 1994).
438 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
419 Id. at 453.
440 id.
4 Every Southern state that sought readmission to the Union, in addition to each new state
entering the Union, was required to ratify it and the later Reconstruction Amendments as a
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Additionally, statutes to amplify the Reconstruction Amendments were
passed.44  The Civil Rights Act of 1866, although passed over President
Andrew Johnson's veto, stated that "all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed," were citizens of
the United States, and were granted the same right to make and enforce
contracts, sue, give evidence, acquire property, and were entitled "to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property
as is enjoyed by [Wihite citizens."44 3 This is an even stronger statue than the
1964 Civil Rights Act under President Lyndon Johnson.
These reforms theoretically rectified some of the legal disabilities slaves,
free Blacks, and other workers had endured under state laws and customs.
However, in the coming years, courts gave many of the provisions "miserly
interpretations. '"" Despite that, these Reconstruction enactments continue to
form the core of the antidiscrimination tradition in employment law today. For
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most expansive of all
pieces of federal legislation in defining the rights and remedies of those who
have been discriminated against in employment law. It prohibits discrimination
based upon "race, color, sex, religion, or national origin" in any of the "terms,
conditions, or privileges" of employment." 5 Those subject to violations of this
law are entitled to injunctive relief or may receive back pay, reinstatement or
hire, back pay, and other equitable relief. These remedies seem to have won
general acceptance in the population-at-large, for they correct perceived
individualized injustices in hiring perpetrated on those of certain groups. Does
the systemic culmination of these individual wrongs deserve any less? It is this
author's opinion that it does not. The development of racial discrimination in
the individual workplace is a derivative byproduct of the macro-level problem
condition to being admitted to the Union. To show commitment to free labor, states were
encouraged to include parallel provisions in their state constitutions. These state constitutional
provisions speak in terms of the right to labor freely. Id. at 8. There is some concern over the
"forced" acceptance of these amendments (13, 14, 15) as a condition precedent for the
confederate states (succeeding states) to reenter the Union.
442 The Fifteenth Amendment provided that neither the United States nor any of the states
could deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. This language had the effect of giving men only the right to vote. Id. at 8 (quoting
U.S. CONST. Amend. XV).
443 These statutes include the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (now codified as 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1981, 1982), the Anti-Peonage Statute (now codified as 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1982, 1994), and
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983).
4" 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981-1982.
44 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1993).
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of racial hatred and discrimination in the society as a whole." 6 Those who
advocate civil rights legislation for individual instances of discrimination and
yet oppose affirmative action in the boardroom or classroom generally do not
see the connection between the two and, as a result, work against themselves.
Employment-at- Will
Working people whose employment relationship was defined by a status
category of master-servant law had their employment governed by law and
custom rather than by mutual obligation. With the rise of industrialization,
traditional status categories defining employment relationships did not readily
apply to the changing conditions and relationships of the new industrial
workplace. Therefore, a category reflecting traditional notions of a master's
authority, but lacking any paternalistic notions of duty and commitment
emerged. 47 Courts submerged this new category under the rhetoric of freedom
of contract. Legal rules governing employment of individuals who did not fall
under contract were unclear. 448 However, near the end of the nineteenth
century many issues were resolved by the "employment at will" rule.
The at-will doctrine was first announced in a treatise on masters and
servants in 1877.449 Here, H.G. Wood stated the rule, in the United States, is
that an employee is presumed to be hired as an at-will employee.450 Although
the doctrine lacked legal foundation, all states eventually adopted the at-will
446 An anecdotal comment is offered here that this author has heard though the years. In
the North they (White) like the group (Black), but dislike the individual. In the South they
dislike the group (Blacks), but like the individual (Black). Also of note some American Blacks,
having lived in England, have noted by comparison that Brit's dislike their former colonial
Caribbean Blacks because they are seen as arrogant. While Americans on the other hand, like
the Caribbean Blacks because they are seen as being more industrious, confident, and success
oriented. Isn't it interesting that the Blacks "of" each country tend to be more preferred by the
other country in the view of some American Blacks who have lived in England?
447 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 437.
448 Id. at 9.
449 The English rule maintained that agricultural workers who were not under contract for a
fixed term could be considered to be retained for a one-year term, a unit of time determined by
the growing season. Other rules considered the pay-period the term ofempioyment. The issues
at stake included:
1. Whether employees could be held liable for damages for breach of contract, or even
forfeiture of wages if they left before the end of the contract term;
2. In what situation, at what times, and with what consequences could employees quit; and
3. In what circumstances and with what consequences could employees be fired. Id. at 9.
450 H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).
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doctrine. The doctrine is currently applied in all U.S. jurisdictions except
Montana, which has enacted a just cause termination statute. The at-will
doctrine has been judicially created in most jurisdictions following it, with the
exception of California and Georgia, both of which have statutes containing at-
will language.
The at-will doctrine had only one exception until the 1950s. That
exception was that a written contract between the employer and the employee,
for a determinate duration of time, could be terminated only for just cause. In
1959, the California Court of Appeals adopted the first judicially recognized
exception to the at-will doctrine: the public policy exception. The public policy
exception provided that an employer cannot terminate an employee for a reason
that violates public policy without liability for wrongful termination.451
Although this exception did not gain widespread recognition until the 1970s
and 1980s, it is now recognized by most jurisdictions.452 Employers may not
act in bad faith, even if terminating an at-will employee. Again, it is obvious
that in taking this stance, the court allows some who should benefit, to suffer
some unfavorable consequences due to broader concerns for public policy. So
it is with affirmative action.
While courts and legislators are willing to allow unfavorable consequences
to affirmative action, they are not so willing to allow discriminatory practices or
discrimination to be given to the physically disabled, even if it means an
employer will have to accommodate or adjust to hire a physically disabled
individual.
F. Two Wrongs Do Make a Right: Disability Discrimination
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits
discrimination against qualified individuals because of disability in job
application procedures, hiring, promotions, discharge, compensation, and
general terms and conditions of employment. This precludes the use of
selection criteria, which screen out individuals with disabilities, unless the
criteria are job related and consistent with business necessity. Even when
criteria are job related and meet business necessity, an employer may not
exclude a disabled individual if the individual, with reasonable
451 The case cited by this 1877 treatise supporting the at-will presumption actually provided
no support for the doctrine. LIONEL J. POSTIC, WRONGFUL TERMINATION: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY xix (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C. 1994).
452 Id.
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accommodation, could perform the job. This is true unless the necessary
accommodation would constitute an "undue hardship" for the employer.453
Under the ADA employers are not only prohibited from intentional
discrimination against disabled persons, they are also prohibited from practices
that have the effect of discriminating against disabled persons, and /or
perpetuating the past effects of discrimination. The following practices are
prohibited:
1. Limiting, segregating, or classifying an applicant or employee because
of his disability so as to adversely affect his opportunities or status;
2. Entering into a contractual relationship with an employment or referral
agency, union, or other organization that has the effect of subjecting employees
or applicants with a disability to prohibited discrimination;
3. Utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the
effect of discrimination or perpetuating the effects of discrimination because of
disability;
4. Denying equal job benefits to a qualified individual because of the
known disability of a person with whom the qualified individual is known to
have a relationship of association;
5. Not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of a otherwise qualified employee or applicant with a
disability unless to do so would impose undue hardship on the employer;
6. Denying job opportunities to an otherwise qualified employee or
applicant with a disability in other to avoid having to make reasonable
accommodations for that disability;
7. Using qualification standards or employment tests that tend to screen
out individuals with disabilities, unless the qualification standards or
453 CONSTANCE BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 347-348 (West
Publishing Company 1991). The ADA defines "undue hardship" as an activity requiring
"significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light of: (1) the nature and cost of the
accommodation needed; (2) the overall financial resources of the facility, the number of persons
employed at the facility, the effect on expenses and resources or any other impact of the
accommodation on the facility; (3) the overall financial resources of the employer and the
overall size of the business with respect to the number of employees and the type, number, and
location of its facilities; and (4) the type of operation of the employer including the
composition, structure and functions of the workforce, the geographic separateness, and
administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility in question to the employer.
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employment tests are shown to be job related and are consistent with business
necessity;
8. Failing to select and conduct job testing in such a way as to ensure that
when the test is administered to an applicant or employee with a disability that
impairs his sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the results of the test accurately
reflect the skills or aptitude that test is designed to measure, rather than
reflecting the sensory, manual, or speaking impairment.
454
Are not the preceding practices very similar to those desired by minorities
in terms of affirmative action? Is this not affirmative action for the disabled,
and rightly so?
If an applicant /employee is disabled, he may only be excluded from the
employment opportunity if, due to his disability, he cannot perform the
essential functions of the job, or if the employment of the individual with the
disability poses a significant health or safety risk to others. The ADA requires
that employers make reasonable accommodations to an employee's disability as
long as it does not cause "undue hardship." Therefore, even if the disability
prevents an individual from performing the essential functions of the position,
or presents a safety risk, the employer is required to assess if there is a
reasonable accommodation that will permit the individual to be employed
despite his disability.455 Why are accommodations required for differences here
and no longer required in general affirmative action areas?
In Board of Trustees of University of Alabama in Birmingham v.
Garrett,456 the Supreme Court observed some of the "wrongs" that have been
created by the Americans with Disabilities Act. "... the Court believed that if
the mentally retarded were afforded suspect status, the Court would not know
where to draw the line when it came to other individuals with similar
immutable disabilities. 45 7 Upon full review of the case, "The Court concluded
that as long as states are acting rationally they are not required under the
'*4 Id. at 348.
411 Additionally, Title I includes a non-exhaustive list of what might constitute "reasonable
accommodation" including: (1)making work facilities accessible; (2)restructuring jobs or
modifying work schedules; (3)acquiring or modifying equipment or devices; (4)modifying
examinations, training materials or policies; and (5)providing qualified readers or interpreters or
other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. Id. at 348-49.
456 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
457 Jaclyn A. Okin, Has the Surpeme Court Gone Too Far?: An Analysis of the University
of Alambama v. Garrett and Its Impact on People With Disabilities, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 663 (2001).
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Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for people with
disabilities., 458 Here, the Court demonstrates that while the Americans with
Disabilities Act may be a "remedy," it is also a "wrong," having blurred lines of
application, and leading to possible infringement upon state's rights.
The above legal analogies from interned Japanese Americans to the ADA
represent several areas and events which have led to a second "wrong" being
introduced to correct an original wrong. Yet, society's incomplete logic and
inconsistent legal reasoning have led to the failure to place Blacks in an equal
position as their non-minority counterparts. Ostensibly, "the law has made him
equal, but man has not." In comparison, "two wrongs do/can make a right."
Again, consider the various analogies in math, physics, and the law.
XIV. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to refute the incomplete logic and legal reasoning
that has led to the demise of affirmative action through justification of the
reverse discrimination concept by refuting the misconception and connotation
that one wrong can be remedied without creating a second "wrong," or remedy.
The connotation of "wrong" is important. This incomplete logic has produced
legal reasoning that is not accurate and often misleading, producing opponents
who inconsistently apply their logic alleviating the hope that Blacks will some
day be "equal." Additionally, this incomplete logic had encroached on those
who favor affirmative action leaving them with misinformation and an absence
of conviction. James Madison once noted, "Since the general civilization of
mankind, I believe there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom
of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power, than by
violent and sudden usurpations. ' 4 59 Incorporating diversity brings strength,
while challenge, to some causes confusion, and fear for others. If people lack
clear goals to strive toward, they are more comfortable staying where they are.
Therefore, without clear vision of the impact, both cultural and economic, that
the defeat of affirmative action programs for minorities could have, the entire
nation will ultimately suffer. This notion was further explained by taking a
brief look into some philosophical concepts, noting that without the imposition
of a "second wrong," it is unlikely that minorities will break free of the cyclical
458 Id. at 672.
459 EUGENE C. GERHART, QUOTE IT II: A DICTIONARY OF MEMORABLE LEGAL QUOTATIONS
158 (William S.Hein Company 1988) (quoting James Madison, Speech in the Virginia
Convention, June 16, 1788).
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suppression of the "first wrong." This article has attempted to clarify the
incomplete logic used against affirmative action by using mathematics,
physics, and statistics to define the impact of this incomplete logic of "two
wrongs do not make a right," using law school admissions as an example. To
buttress these analogies and arguments, areas in law have been identified where
two wrongs do apparently make a right such as veteran's preference,
environmental law, and labor law. Without affirmative action, equality of
Blacks will remain an elusive goal. "The end of law is not to abolish or
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. "460 Ultimately, no one will be
free if achieving Black equality remains opposed.




"ubijus ibi remedium" - 'where there is law (a right) there is a remedy.'
If the law provides a right it follows that it provides a remedy for violation of
it.462 Perhaps neither the law nor man has made him equal?
XV. EPILOGUE
As this article goes to press, there was another set back for African-
Americans in Tulsa, Oklahoma. First, some background information is
necessary. On May 31, 1921, a White mob was deputized, and some
individuals were armed with weapons by the Mayor of the City of Tulsa and the
Tulsa Chief of Police.463 Reports on the cause of the riot vary. The Mayor also
deputized members of the National Guard. The Mayor, the Chief of Police,
460 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CiviL GOVERNMENT: BOOK II IN THE GREAT LEGAL
PHILOSOPHERS: SELECTED READING IN JURISPRUDENCE 145 (Clarence Morris ed. 1959).
461 Attributed to David Boren, University President of the University of Oklahoma. The
author notes that Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma was a key case in Black
America's continuing drive for equality in education. The school in question at the time of that
case was the University of Oklahoma. That case was a forerunner to Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of
Topeka, Kansas. President Boren was not the University of Oklahoma President then. He
graduated from the University of Oklahoma School of Law in 1963, twelve years after the case.
462 JOHN GRAY, LAWYERS' LATIN, AVADE-MECUM 136 (Robert Hale Ltd., London 2002).
463 Amicus Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Defendants the State Of
Oklahoma and the City of Tulsa at 5, Alexander, et al., v. Governor of Oklahoma, City of Tulsa,
City of Tulsa Police Department (No. 03-CV- 133E(c)) (Northern District of Oklahoma) (2003).
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and the new deputies killed African American residents of a section of Tulsa
called Greenwood, also known at the time as the Black Wall Street, by
dragging them from their homes.464 The mob looted buildings and burned
Greenwood to the ground . 5  Then officials fired a machine gun on the
residents, as well as using airplanes to shoot at, and drop incendiary devices on,
the residents .4 66 Other citizens were detained and forced to work in captivity in
conditions reminiscent of slavery. 467 The riot resulted in the death of over 300
residents of Greenwood. 468 After the riot was over, Tulsa city officials refused
to help the victims, and impeded attempts to rebuild.469  Oklahoma state
officials, as well as City of Tulsa officials, tried to suppress any information
and talks of the riots.4 70 There has been a vocal and written diatribe of
accusations and denials over the years. In addition, Greenwood has not been a
cause celebre', nor has this lingering, simmering issue received string national
attention. In 2000, the legislature of the State of Oklahoma created the
Oklahoma Commission to Study the Riot of 1921.471 While the state has
acknowledged the wrong of the response to the Tulsa riot,4 72 Blacks have been
denied rights based on the poor excuse of the statute of limitations. Of course,
there was no opportunity for Blacks to resolve their complaints or wrongs
committed against them. Look who was against them. All roads were closed to
the state, so now it uses the statute of limitations to deny any remedy, which is
an equitable wrong. It appears that legislation may be the best way to correct
this wrong. This injustice to the Tulsa victims is mentioned primarily to
464 Id.
465 id.
466 Id. at 5 and 6.
467 Id. at 6.
468 Id. at 6 and 2.
469 Id.
470 Id. at 7.
471 Id. at 2.
472 "[T]he mayor of Tulsa promised to compensate the victims of the riot for the losses they
had suffered. He declared that a claims commission would be established to compensate the
victims of the riot. Finally, the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce states that as 'quickly as possible
rehabilitation will take place and reparation made... Tulsa feels intensely humiliated.' ... a
commission created by the Oklahoma state legislature... reiterated, 'reparations are the right
thing to do." CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST
HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 284-6 (Robert Weil ed., W.W. Norton &
Company 2004) citing Scott Ellsworth, "[Tihe Tulsa Race Riot," in Tulsa Race Riot: A Report
by the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Race Riot of 1921 ([Oklahoma City]: The
Commission, 2001.) available at http://www.ok-history.mus.ok.us/trrc/freport.htm.
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emphasize the need for a remedy, and yet the remedy is labeled a "wrong."
Denying a remedy in the Courts is itself, a injustice.
"Justice or Just Us."
473
473 A saying amongst many Afro-Americans.
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